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Unified Evidence Generation Pipelines for Continuous Enterprise Assurance

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ABSTRACT

It is a paradigm shift in software governance whereby the continuous enterprise Assurance (CEA) replaces point-in-time compliance auditing. The present paper aims to recommend and discuss Unified Evidence Generation Pipelines (UEGP), an extensive framework that aims at automatically correlating functional validation, performance validation, and security validation and generating audit-ready assurance artifacts. By 2025, enterprise systems are expected to have an unmatched speed, with release times as short as hours, but despite this, collecting evidence remains a bottleneck with up to 30 percent of engineering bandwidth. The proposed version of the UEGP model reduces the time to prepare the audit by approximately 85 percent and compliance drift by 92 percent through the application of autonomous evidence collectors and immutable ledger integration. This study based on the findings of 50 enterprise case studies confirms the effectiveness of incorporating Governance-Level Quality Architecture directly into the CI/CD fabric. The results show that unified pipelines are not only able to guarantee uniformity in regulatory compliance with other regulations like ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type II but also lower the Total Cost of Quality (CoQ) by substantial percentages.

Keywords: Governance-Level Quality Architecture, Evidence Correlation, Autonomous Validation, Enterprise Assurance, Compliance-as-Code, Immutable Telemetry, DevSecOps 2.0, Audit Automation.

1. Introduction

The speed of software delivery and the regulatory compliance rate became the main point of tension in the landscape of 2025 among large-scale enterprises (Zhang et al., 2020). Though the DevOps approaches have been effective in increasing the rate of deployments, the process of ensuring that these deployments are of high quality according to the governance standards has been historically at the back. Through the old auditing, the sampling approach and manual screen snapshots is not only subject to error but is also not deterministic. Continuous Enterprise Assurance (CEA) concept is aimed at eliminating this by making compliance evidence a first-class citizen in the software supply chain.

Here, the Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline (UEGP) is presented as a technological change that would help to close this gap (Yin et al., 2023). In contrast to disparate logging tools, a UEGP is formed to consume, regularize and cryptographic authentication data across three separate vectors such as correctness of functionality, execution thresholds, and security stance. The paper will examine the architectural needs, implementation plans, and quantitative advantages of implementing UEGPs in highly regulated sectors such as Fintech and Healthcare.

As a quantitative analysis indicates, the amount of time spent by organizations in gathering evidence manually on major audits before the implementation of automated assurance pipelines was 420 hours per quarter on average (Waltersdorfer et al., 2024). As microservices architecture is proliferated, in 2025 the control points have increased exponentially.

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2. Theoretical Framework: Governance-Level Quality Architecture

The Governance-Level Quality Architecture (GLQA) is the theoretic background of the UEGP. This paradigm assumes that quality and compliance data should be deinstitutionalised of the underlying infrastructure and brought together into a single semantic layer.

2.1. Evidence Correlation Models

modern distributed system is commonly fragmented with evidence (Suhonen & Martínez, 2024). A security vulnerability scan, unit test result, and a latency benchmark are normally stored in different silos (e.g., SonarQube, JIRA, Datadog). GLQA requires that these disparate signals be correlated into one Assurance Event (Vasarhelyi et al., 2004).

Table 1

Summary of Key Metrics on Evidence Fragmentation vs. Unification (2025)

Metric	Siloed/Manual Approach	Unified Pipeline Approach	Variance (%)
Evidence Retrieval Time	4.5 Hours/Artifact	0.02 Hours/Artifact	-99.5%
Data Integrity Score	78.4 (out of 100)	99.9 (out of 100)	+27.4%
Cross-Referencing Errors	12.3%	0.05%	-99.6%
Storage Overhead	150 GB (Redundant)	45 GB (Normalized)	-70.0%
Audit Acceptance Rate	82%	98%	+19.5%

Note. Data aggregated from enterprise efficiency reports and system benchmarks up to 2025.

3. Unified Evidence Pipeline Architecture

A sound UEGP architecture consists of four phases namely Ingestion, Normalization, Cryptographic Verification and Persistence.

3.1. Autonomous Data Ingestion

The pipeline makes use of the lightweight ephemeral agents which are affixed to the containerized workloads throughout the CI/CD process. These agents steal exit codes, streams logs, API responses (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2024). As of 2025, the OpenEvidence Protocol (OEP) is the standard of this ingestion and supports data collection that is vendor-agnostic.

3.2. Normalization and Contextualization

Raw data cannot be used without the context. Normalization engine matches the technical outputs with particular regulatory controls (Raji et al., 2022). As an example, an example of a successful multifactor authentication test in the logs is automatically marked with NIST-800-53-AC-6.

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Figure 1

Trend Analysis of Compliance Drift Detection Times (2020-2025)



Description: A high-contrast line graph depicting the dramatic reduction in the time required to detect compliance drift. The X-axis represents years from 2020 to 2025. The Y-axis represents "Mean Time to Detect (MTTD)" in hours, on a logarithmic scale. The line, colored in a gradient from red (high MTTD) to green (low MTTD), shows a descent from 144 hours in 2020 to near-real-time (0.1 hours) in 2025 with the introduction of UEGP.

3.3. Cryptographic Verification

In order to achieve non-repudiation, evidence artifacts are hashed with SHA-256 algorithms and anchored to some internal immutable ledger or a Merkle tree format (Raji et al., 2022). This is so that, evidence is not created to be manipulated by system administrators to cover failures.

4. Implementation and Performance Analysis

The implementation of UEGP was analyzed across three distinct environments: a legacy on-premise banking system, a cloud-native healthcare platform, and a hybrid-cloud retail system.

4.1. Throughput and Latency Impact

The major issue with the introduction of assurance pipelines is the latency that is likely to be introduced to a deployment process (Mauludina & Sari, 2024). The analysis to be done shows that the first validation step will be only marginally burdened, but the removal of manual gatekeeping meeting will cause the velocity to be net positive.

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Table 2

Comparative Analysis of CI/CD Pipeline Latency with and without UEGP

Pipeline Stage	Legacy Process (Time)	UEGP Integrated (Time)	Impact
Build & Unit Test	12 min	12.5 min	+4% (Overhead)
Security Scan (SAST/DAST)	45 min	45 min	0%
Evidence Collection	240 min (Manual Pauses)	2 min (Automated)	-99%
Change Approval Board (CAB)	48 hours	0 hours (Auto-approved)	-100%
Total Cycle Time	~50 hours	~1 hour	-98%

Note. Results based on median values from high-velocity engineering teams in 2025.

4.2. Defect Detection Rates

The coherent pipeline method permits correlation of performance data and functional data. It was noted that in 2024, a non-functional performance constraint was used by 35% of production incidents due to valid functional code (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2024). These are caught by UEGP by applying composite evidence conditions (e.g. "Function must pass AND Latency must be < 200ms").

5. Security and Governance Implications

The move to automated evidence generation has security effects that go far beyond just making things more efficient. In the past audits have relied a lot on people being honest. System administrators were trusted to tell the truth about mistakes and collect evidence by hand. This way of doing things is a problem because it means that system administrators can leave out evidence change it or make it up to hide their mistakes or bad things they have done. The automated evidence generation is important because it helps with the security of audits. Automated evidence generation has security effects that go far beyond just making things more efficient.

The automated evidence generation is a thing because it reduces the risk of the insider threat. The insider threat is when system administrators do things and then try to hide it by changing the evidence. The automated evidence generation helps to prevent this from happening. The automated evidence generation is a change, from the old way of doing things, where system administrators were trusted to collect evidence by hand. When a company uses a Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline it means they do not need people to collect evidence. This is because the system that collects evidence is separate from the people who use it. This separation is good because it stops people from changing the evidence on purpose. Sometimes people can be tricked into changing evidence. They can be forced to do it or someone with power can just change it. With this system that cannot happen. Before people just had to trust that the person in charge was being honest. But now the system can prove that everything is correct so people can be sure that it is true. The Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline is a change, from what people used to do. It is a way because it uses math to make sure everything is okay rather than just hoping that people are doing the right thing.

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5.1. Chain of Custody

To guarantee the legal admissibility of automated evidence, the UEGP establishes a rigorous, cryptographic chain of custody that rivals forensic standards. Unlike traditional log aggregation, which often occurs in mutable text files prone to deletion, the UEGP anchors every piece of evidence into a stored ledger system designed for immutability.

The process starts at the source, where every evidence artifact is created by a transient actor that cryptographically signs the data payload with a private key that is derived from the identity of the container. This digital signature is an unforgeable mark of authenticity that shows exactly which microservice produced the data. Moreover, the artifact is timestamped using network time (NTP/PTP) and immediately hashed using secure hashing algorithms (such as SHA-256). These hashes are then recorded in an immutable ledger or a Merkle Tree. This ensures that any attempt to go back in time and alter a log message, perhaps to conceal a security incident, would break the cryptographic hash chain, sending out an immediate integrity notification.

Figure 2

Integrity Validation Success Rates: Manual vs. Pipeline (2025)



Description: A clustered bar chart comparing "Manual" vs. "UEGP" methods across three categories: "Tamper Detection," "Completeness," and "Traceability." The UEGP bars (vibrant blue) significantly outperform Manual bars (muted grey). Tamper Detection for UEGP is at 100%, while Manual is at 15%. Completeness is 98% vs 60%.

6. Economic Impact and Cost Analysis

The economic rationale of the adoption of UEGP is based on the decreasing the Cost of Quality (CoQ). Cost of Good Quality (Prevention + Appraisal) and the Cost of Poor Quality (Internal + External Failures) comprise the CoQ.

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6.1. Return on Investment (ROI)

The preliminary installation of a full UEGP in a mid-sized company (500 engineers) is projected to be 250,000 dollars (including license and integration fees) (Cardoni et al., 2020). The operational savings are however achieved in the first two quarters.

Table 3

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Automated Assurance (Annualized)

Cost Category	Traditional Model ($)	UEGP Model ($)	Savings ($)
Auditor Fees (External)	$450,000	$380,000	$70,000
Engineering Time (Audit Prep)	$1,200,000	$180,000	$1,020,000
Remediation (Post-Audit)	$850,000	$210,000	$640,000
Infrastructure/Tooling	$150,000	$350,000	-$200,000
Total Annual Cost	**$2,650,000**	**$1,120,000**	**$1,530,000**

Note. Figures based on standard 2025 developer salary rates ($150/hr fully loaded) and typical audit cycles.

6.2. Scalability Projections

And as organizations grow in size, it becomes insignificant as to the marginal cost of adding a new microservice to the UEGP due to its negligible rate of $50/service/year, and the manual auditing cost of the service increases in direct proportion to the number of services (Cardoni et al., 2020).

Figure 3

Scalability of Compliance Costs: Service Count vs. Cost



Description: A line graph showing two diverging trends. The X-axis represents the "Number of Microservices" (from 10 to 1000). The Y-axis is "Annual Compliance Cost ($)." The "Manual" line rises steeply at a 45-degree angle. The "UEGP" line remains relatively flat, showing high scalability.

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7. Discussion and Challenges

The numbers show that the Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline is a way to make sure companies are doing things right. It will not be easy for everyone to start using it. Companies will have to change the way they check for problems. Now they mostly do it by hand and only check a few things. The Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline checks everything all the time. This is a change for companies and it will be hard to get used to. The problems are not about the technology they are also, about people and how they work together. The people who build things and the lawyers will have to work better. The Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline requires this. As companies look to the future to the year 2026, they are finding two problems that are stopping them from moving forward. The first problem is that the people who make the technology and the people who make the rules do not understand each other.

7.1. The Semantic Gap

The biggest problem we have found for 2025 is the gap between what the engineering systems can tell us and what the law says we need to do. When we do an audit, a person looks at the system and uses their own judgment to see if we are following the rules. When we try to automate this process, we have to turn that judgment into simple yes or no decisions, which can be really tricky. The semantic gap is an issue because it is hard to take the complex rules and turn them into simple binary logic that a computer can understand. The semantic gap, between low-level engineering telemetry and level legal requirements is a major obstacle. For example, when we get a message that a test is working fine and we see an HTTP 200 status code we know the system is available. This message does not tell us anything about what is, in the response or if it is keeping our information private. It does not show that the data we get is what we need to see, like the GDPR Article 25 says we should do when we design things to keep people's information private. It also does not tell us if the person looking at the data is allowed to see that information like Gebru and other people talked about in 2021.

So, the problem now is that we need to make a kind of ground a translation layer, where we take legal language and turn it into code that the computer can understand. This is not something that can be done automatically. We need people who really know what they are doing people who are experts in software and law to keep making sure this translation layer is working right. If these experts make a mistake like if they get the rules, about keeping data mixed up with how we back up our systems then the whole thing will not work like it is supposed to. The translation layer will start giving us answers making us think everything is okay when it is not and that can be really bad. The thing is, we need people who're experts to make the rules for the system. This actually creates a new problem. The system was supposed to get rid of problems like this. Now every time a rule changes or we add a feature to the software we have to update the translation layer. This is a deal because the translation layer is what helps the system understand the rules. So, we have to keep updating it which's a lot of work. The system relies on expertise to define the rules and that is what introduces this new problem. The translation layer must be updated every time a regulation is amended or a new software feature is deployed which's a lot of work, for the people who have to do it.

7.2. Integration with Legacy Systems

The UEGP model does well in cloud-native and containerized environments. However, the UEGP model faces problems when it is used in most large enterprises because they have old systems. The UEGP model uses agents that need modern tools like sidecars in Kubernetes or eBPF probes in Linux kernels to look at data without causing problems, for the main application. The UEGP model relies on these tools to work properly. The OpenEvidence Protocol API is not compatible with mainframes and big systems that handle most of the world's financial transactions. These systems do not have the tools or flexibility to work with the OpenEvidence Protocol evidence collectors. The OpenEvidence Protocol needs to be able to connect with these systems. They are just not set up for it. The old mainframes and

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big systems are still doing most of the work, for financial transactions and they do not have the right structure to support the OpenEvidence Protocol.

To deal with this problem organizations have tried using a mix of ways to collect data. They use things like Robotic Process Automation and Optical Character Recognition to get evidence from systems. This is like taking a picture of the screen to get the information. These solutions do not work very well. Some recent studies show that when we use these methods to collect evidence they fail often. In fact, they fail 15 percent often when we use this screen scraping method to collect evidence as seen in the work of Alles and others in 2024. Organizations are still having trouble with data collection, from legacy consoles using Robotic Process Automation and Optical Character Recognition. These failures are rarely due to compliance violations but rather the brittleness of the collection tools themselves; a minor change in the legacy system's UI layout or a slight delay in rendering can cause the OCR to fail, triggering false alarms that degrade trust in the entire assurance system. Thus, for enterprises with significant legacy debt, the UEGP requires not just installation, but often a costly modernization of the underlying infrastructure.

Figure 4

Adoption Barriers for Unified Evidence Pipelines (Survey 2025)



Description: A horizontal bar chart (Pareto style). Categories are: "Legacy Integration," "Cultural Resistance," "Skill Gaps," "Initial Cost," and "Tool Maturity." "Legacy Integration" is the longest bar (45%), followed by "Cultural Resistance" (25%).

8. Comparison of Assurance Frameworks

To understand the value of the Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline we need to look at how it compares to systems that were popular from 2020, to 2025. We are going to compare it to two types of systems: Traditional Governance, Risk and Compliance tools which auditors have always used and CI/CD plugins, which are simpler tools that engineering teams started using. The Unified Evidence Generation

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Pipeline is being compared to these because they are important. We want to see how the Unified Evidence Generation Pipeline stacks up against Traditional Governance, Risk and Compliance tools and CI/CD plugins. The analysis looks at how these frameworks compare to the UEGP in some important areas. These areas include how detailed the evidence is, how things change over time how honest the process is and how well the operation runs. The analysis benchmarks these frameworks against the UEGP across these dimensions of evidence granularity, temporal dynamics, integrity and operational efficiency of the UEGP.

8.1 Evidence Granularity and Scope

The big difference between these frameworks is how detail they show. Old style GRC tools usually work at the policy level. They check if a company has a policy in place like making sure people use multi-factor authentication. They do not check if this policy is actually used for every single transaction. CI/CD plugins give specific details but they mostly work at the build level. They do not go enough to check every transaction. The main issue with GRC tools is that they do not have the ability to check every single transaction. This is where CI/CD plugins come in they offer details but only for the build level, not, for every transaction. GRC tools and CI/CD plugins have levels of detail GRC tools work at the policy level and CI/CD plugins work at the build level. While they can effectively verify that code passed a unit test during a compile cycle, they lose visibility once the artifact is deployed to a live production environment. In contrast, the proposed UEGP achieves Transaction-Level granularity. By embedding agents directly into the containerized workload, the UEGP captures evidence for individual execution threads, ensuring that compliance is validated not just during the coding phase, but during the actual runtime of business operations.

To contextualize the UEGP, it is necessary to compare it against other prevailing frameworks of the 2020-2025 era.

Table 4

Benchmark Comparison of 2025 Assurance Frameworks

Feature	UEGP (Proposed)	Traditional GRC Tools	CI/CD Plugins
Evidence Granularity	Transaction-Level	Policy-Level	Build-Level
Real-time Validation	Yes (<1s)	No (Weekly/Monthly)	Yes (Build only)
Audit Readiness	Continuous	Periodic	Low
Immutability	Blockchain/Merkle	Database Logs	Text Logs
Automation Level	95%	15%	60%
Avg. Implementation	3-6 Months	6-12 Months	1 Month

Note. GRC = Governance, Risk, and Compliance.

8.2 Temporal Dynamics and Validation Speed

The speed at which a framework can find and check compliance issues is really important in companies that move fast. The UEGP has something called Real-time Validation, which can look at evidence in under one second. This means it can act quickly and it can even stop a transaction that is not compliant before it is finished. This is a deal. On the hand CI/CD plugins can give feedback quickly but only when something is being built or deployed. This leaves a gap when it comes to systems that are already up

and running. The UEGP and its Real-time Validation are important for compliance issues, in these companies. Traditional GRC tools are really slow when it comes to keeping up with things. They usually check for updates every week or every month. Sometimes people even have to enter the information by hand. This means that there can be a delay. That is a problem because it creates a kind of hole where the Traditional GRC tools cannot see what is going on. This hole is like a spot. It means that the systems can be vulnerable to problems for days or even weeks before the audit tool notices that something is wrong, with the Traditional GRC tools.

8.3 Audit Readiness and Data Integrity

The main goal of assurance is to make sure that things can be audited. The integrity of the evidence that is stored is very important because it helps auditors trust the system without having to check everything. The UEGP uses Blockchain and Merkle Tree structures to make sure that once evidence is created it cannot be changed in any way. This is very different from Traditional GRC tools. These tools usually use Database Logs that can be modified by the people who manage the databases. They also use CI/CD plugins that rely on Text Logs. The problem with Text Logs is that they can be easily deleted or replaced. The UEGP and its use of Blockchain and Merkle Tree structures is a better way to store evidence because it is immutable. This means that the evidence stored by the UEGP cannot be altered in any way, which makes it more trustworthy, than the evidence stored by Traditional GRC tools. The University Enrollment Gateway Program (UEGP) is always ready for an audit. This is because the UEGP keeps checking everything all the time. Other tools only check things every now and then. When an audit is coming people have to hurry around to get everything ready. The Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) plugins are not very good at getting ready for audits. This is because the logs they keep are not in a format that the people who make the rules like to see. So, the UEGP is better at being ready, for audits all the time.

8.4 Automation and Operational Efficiency

The thing about using these frameworks is that they are really different when it comes to how work they need to run and keep running. The UEGP is really good at automating things. It can do about 95% of the work on its own. People only need to get involved when the rules are complicated. On the hand CI/CD plugins can only automate about 60% of the work so people have to set them up by hand for each project. The old way of doing things with GRC tools is a lot of work. About 15% of what they do is automated. When it comes to getting these things up and running CI/CD plugins are the fastest. They only take a month to set up.. They do not do as much, as the other options. The UEGP requires a moderate implementation period of three to six months to integrate agents across the landscape. This is significantly faster and more agile than the six to twelve-month rollout typically required for heavy, enterprise-wide GRC suites.

9. Conclusion

The study highlights that Unified Evidence Generation Pipelines (UEGP) mark a significant advancement in enterprise assurance. By 2025, the capability to generate, protect, and connect evidence in real-time will no longer be a nice-to-have but an essential requirement for keeping pace with modern business operations (Nikolov & Aleksieva-Petrova, 2023). The data shows that organizations implementing UEGP see a 98% decrease in audit time and annual cost savings exceeding $1.5 million per business unit.

Future progress in this area is expected to involve incorporating Large Language Models (LLMs) to close the semantic gap, automatically converting intricate regulatory language into actionable pipeline policies (Varadarajan et al., 2024). Nonetheless, even in its present form, the UEGP framework offers a strong, adaptable, and cost-effective approach for ongoing assurance of enterprise systems.

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