

Data Sovereignty and Compliance in Multi-Cloud Deployments: Evaluating Governance Models and Regulatory Challenges

Sapna Nishant Pillai

Independent Researcher, USA

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ABSTRACT

The rapid adoption of multi-cloud strategies has driven a sea-change in enterprise architecture, providing unprecedented scalability, operational resilience, and freedom from vendor lock-in while creating a new set of governance issues such as how to address compliance and data sovereignty across diverse cloud environments. As many organizations utilize multiple CSPs located in different jurisdictions, there are differences in data protection standards, data localization requirements, and privacy regulations between jurisdictions that lead to a fragmented global regulatory landscape in cloud computing. This article reviews the intersection of data sovereignty principles and regulatory compliance in a cross-cloud, multi-cloud, shared distributed cloud environment. It covers the key elements of governance, technical controls, and regulatory complexities, and distinguishes between key concepts such as data sovereignty, data residency, and jurisdictional compliance, as well as distributed cloud challenges. This article reviews possible governance frameworks and technical implementations and gives a practical framework of how organizations can comply with data sovereignty and still retain operational flexibility.

Keywords: Data Sovereignty, Multi-Cloud Governance, Regulatory Compliance, Distributed Architecture, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies

1. Introduction

The contemporary enterprise technology landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation, with multi-cloud architectures emerging as the dominant paradigm for organizations seeking to optimize their digital infrastructure. The recent Flexera State of the Cloud Report found enterprises are continuing to expand their cloud use in spite of the economy, with many pursuing multi-cloud strategies to reduce risk and improve business continuity [1]. This architectural approach represents a significant departure from traditional single-vendor cloud deployments, enabling organizations to leverage best-of-breed services from multiple cloud service providers (CSPs) while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to rapidly evolving market conditions and technological innovations.

The strategic imperative driving multi-cloud adoption extends beyond simple risk diversification. Organizations are increasingly recognizing that different cloud providers excel in distinct service domains—Amazon Web Services (AWS) may offer superior analytics capabilities, Microsoft Azure provides seamless integration with enterprise productivity tools, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP) delivers advanced machine learning infrastructure. By orchestrating services across multiple providers, enterprises can construct hybrid architectures that optimize for performance, cost-efficiency, and functional capabilities while avoiding the constraints of vendor lock-in that characterized earlier generations of enterprise IT infrastructure.[4]

However, this architectural sophistication introduces unprecedented complexity in governance, particularly concerning data sovereignty and regulatory compliance. The international legal and regulatory environment concerning data protection, privacy and cross-border data flows is becoming increasingly fragmented and prescriptive. Empirical research on cloud computing and data sovereignty shows that organizations are increasingly taking data sovereignty into account in cloud

deployments, and that it is gaining traction in regulatory contexts on an annual basis [2]. This regulatory fragmentation manifests in divergent approaches to data protection, with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) establishing strict controls on personal data processing, China's Data Security Law imposing comprehensive data localization requirements, and various jurisdictions implementing sector-specific regulations that further complicate the compliance landscape.

The challenge of maintaining sovereignty compliance in multi-cloud environments is compounded by the inherent characteristics of cloud computing itself. Cloud architectures are designed to abstract physical infrastructure, dynamically redistributing workloads across geographically dispersed data centers to optimize performance and reliability. This dynamic nature, while providing operational benefits, creates significant challenges for organizations attempting to maintain precise control over data location and processing jurisdictions. Multi-cloud adoption and changing regulations around data sovereignty increase operational complexity, as organizations need to satisfy the specific requirements of each distinct regulatory regime without compromising the efficiency a multi-cloud approach was intended to deliver in the first place.

Data sovereignty is the principle that electronic data is subject to the laws of the country where it is stored and processed, and is increasingly a key consideration for globally operating organizations [3]. This principle has evolved from a theoretical legal concept to a practical operational requirement that shapes cloud architecture decisions, vendor selection criteria, and technical implementation strategies. Sovereignty concerns extend beyond simple data residency to encompass questions of legal jurisdiction, regulatory authority, and governmental access rights that vary significantly across international borders.

Sovereignty and compliance issues can arise in multi-cloud environments in the legal, technical, and operational domains of cloud governance. From a legal perspective, organizations must navigate conflicting regulatory requirements, interpret ambiguous cross-border data transfer provisions, and manage the risk of extraterritorial enforcement actions. Technical considerations of risk arise from the complexity of distributed cloud services, where data may be replicated, cached, or processed in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, often without explicit visibility or control mechanisms. Many organizations lack the oversight to manage data flows between interlinked cloud systems [4], creating blind spots that expose them to compliance violations and regulatory penalties.

The operational dimension of multi-cloud sovereignty presents equally significant challenges. Organizations must establish clear accountability for sovereignty compliance across distributed teams, implement consistent policies across heterogeneous cloud platforms, and maintain the capability to demonstrate compliance through comprehensive audit trails and documentation. This requires not only technical capabilities but also organizational maturity, cross-functional collaboration, and executive commitment to prioritizing sovereignty requirements alongside traditional concerns of cost, performance, and functionality.

The study provided a detailed examination of how sovereignty is translated into operational requirements, which governance models are compliant and which are adaptive, and what technical solutions make it possible to comply with sovereignty while still taking advantage of the multi-cloud environment [5]. By synthesizing legal frameworks, technical architectures, and organizational governance models, this research provides actionable guidance for organizations navigating the complex intersection of multi-cloud adoption and data sovereignty requirements. The analysis demonstrates that effective sovereignty governance requires an integrated approach that addresses legal compliance, technical implementation, and organizational capability development as interconnected rather than independent domains.

2. Literature Review

As organizations matured their adoption of multi-cloud environments, research into the governance of such systems by academic and practitioner communities emerged as a distinct area of scholarly inquiry. The evolution of this literature reflects the broader trajectory of cloud computing adoption, moving from initial explorations of single-cloud governance challenges to nuanced examinations of complexities introduced by multi-cloud architectures. Early research focused primarily on technical security controls and operational best practices, but has progressively expanded to encompass legal, regulatory, and organizational dimensions of cloud governance.

The systematic study of cloud computing governance models has explored various governance structures and strategies for distributed cloud systems, including trade-offs between governance policy centralization and rule flexibility [7]. These studies reveal that multi-cloud governance cannot simply replicate the centralized command-and-control models that characterized traditional enterprise IT governance. Multi-cloud governance must balance the enactment of common principles with the technical and operational heterogeneity of underlying cloud platforms. This balance represents a fundamental tension: consistent policy application across diverse platforms must be reconciled with provider-specific capabilities, regional availability variations, and service-level differences.

The federated governance approach has proven effective for maintaining consistent governance policies while enabling implementation that accounts for platform-specificities. Federated models distribute governance responsibilities across organizational boundaries while maintaining centralized policy definition and oversight mechanisms. This approach recognizes that implementation teams closest to specific workloads possess the contextual knowledge necessary for effective governance execution, while central governance functions provide strategic direction, policy frameworks, and compliance oversight. Research examining federated governance implementations has identified critical success factors including clear delineation of responsibilities, robust communication mechanisms between central and federated teams, and automated compliance monitoring capabilities that provide visibility without creating implementation bottlenecks.

Research on hybrid and multi-cloud reference architectures demonstrates that data classification is a primary component of governance frameworks. Data classification serves as the foundational mechanism through which differentiated governance controls are applied. By classifying data according to regulatory requirements, business criticality and sensitivity, organizations can use differentiated controls that match these requirements rather than applying uniform controls to all workloads. This risk-based approach enables organizations to focus intensive sovereignty controls on data subject to strict regulatory requirements while applying lighter-touch governance to less sensitive information, optimizing the balance between compliance assurance and operational efficiency.

Classification frameworks typically incorporate multiple dimensions including data sensitivity (public, internal, confidential, restricted), regulatory applicability (GDPR-subject, HIPAA-protected, financial records), business criticality (mission-critical, business-important, routine), and processing requirements (real-time, near-real-time, batch). The intersection of these dimensions creates a classification matrix enabling nuanced governance decisions aligned with both regulatory obligations and business needs.

Studies on governance frameworks stress the importance of automation for managing compliance in complex multi-cloud environments [9]. The scale and complexity of modern multi-cloud deployments render manual compliance monitoring increasingly impractical. Organizations operating across multiple cloud providers, regions, and services may manage thousands of distinct resources, each with its own configuration, access controls, and data handling characteristics. Manual oversight of such environments exceeds human cognitive capacity and creates unacceptable latency between configuration changes and compliance verification.

Policy-as-code (translating regulatory requirements into programmatically-enforceable rules) has been emphasized as an enabler for large-scale governance in multi-cloud environments. This

approach represents a paradigm shift from document-based policy specifications to executable policy implementations that can be automatically enforced at deployment time, continuously monitored during operations, and systematically audited for compliance verification. Policy-as-code implementations leverage infrastructure-as-code principles, version control systems, and CI/CD pipelines to embed governance controls directly into the software development and deployment lifecycle rather than treating compliance as a separate, post-deployment activity.

Due to increased regulatory efforts worldwide, the academic literature on data sovereignty in cloud computing has expanded rapidly. This growth reflects both scholarly interest and practical urgency as organizations face escalating penalties for sovereignty violations and regulators demonstrate increasing sophistication in their oversight of cloud computing practices. This literature particularly focuses on cross-border governance of data storage and territoriality in the cloud [3], examining fundamental tensions between the territorial nature of legal jurisdiction and the distributed, location-agnostic architecture of cloud computing infrastructure.

Cloud providers have traditionally optimized their architectures for global efficiency, dynamically routing traffic and distributing workloads across worldwide infrastructure with minimal regard for political boundaries. This approach maximizes performance and reliability but conflicts fundamentally with sovereignty requirements that treat geographic location as legally significant. The resulting tension has prompted both technical innovations (region-specific services, geo-fencing capabilities) and legal developments (cross-border data transfer frameworks, adequacy decisions) aimed at reconciling these competing imperatives.

The cloud computing literature identifies that organizations may face multiple legal obligations depending on where data is stored, processed, and who has access to it [4]. These conflicts manifest as direct conflicts where compliance with one jurisdiction's requirements necessarily violates another's mandates; interpretive ambiguities where regulation applicability to cloud architectures remains unclear; and enforcement uncertainties where multiple jurisdictions claim regulatory authority over the same data or operations.

Most literature considers sovereignty in isolation, either only as a legal issue or only as a technical challenge [5][6]. Legal scholarship examining data sovereignty often lacks engagement with the technical realities of cloud architectures, while technical literature frequently overlooks the legal complexities and regulatory nuances that shape sovereignty requirements. This disciplinary fragmentation limits the practical utility of existing research for organizations that must simultaneously address legal, technical, and operational dimensions of sovereignty compliance. Although there is substantial literature about data sovereignty in general cloud contexts, comparatively little addresses how multi-cloud characteristics influence data sovereignty legal obligations. This work targets these gaps by translating legal obligations into multi-cloud implementations, providing integrated analysis that bridges legal requirements, technical capabilities, and organizational governance models.

3. Conceptual Foundations

For governance frameworks and stakeholder communication, establishing a common vocabulary is essential for precise discussion of multi-cloud sovereignty challenges. The terminology surrounding cloud computing, data governance, and sovereignty has evolved rapidly, with terms often used inconsistently across contexts, disciplines, and organizations. This conceptual imprecision creates communication barriers, complicates policy development, and increases misaligned implementation risks. Establishing clear definitional boundaries for key concepts provides the foundation for effective governance framework development and stakeholder alignment.

Multi-cloud architectures can be defined as the use of multiple cloud services from different providers for different parts of an organization's technology infrastructure and application portfolio [8]. This definition encompasses several distinct architectural patterns, each with different sovereignty governance implications. Distributed multi-cloud architectures distribute individual applications or

workloads across multiple providers, leveraging each provider's strengths for specific application components. Partitioned multi-cloud architecture distributes workloads across multiple providers to leverage strengths, optimize costs, meet performance standards, and spread risk across providers and regions. Hybrid multi-cloud combines on-premises infrastructure with multiple public cloud services, introducing additional complexity around data flows between enterprise data centers and external cloud platforms.

Strategic motivations for multi-cloud adoption extend beyond technical considerations to encompass business, financial, and risk management objectives. From a business perspective, multi-cloud strategies enable organizations to leverage best-of-breed services, maintain negotiating leverage with providers, and avoid strategic dependence on single vendors. Financially, multi-cloud architectures create opportunities for cost optimization through competitive procurement, workload placement decisions based on provider pricing structures, and dynamic resource allocation responding to price variations. From a risk management standpoint, multi-cloud deployments reduce single points of failure, provide geographic redundancy across provider networks, and maintain operational continuity if one provider experiences service disruptions.

Data sovereignty is the idea that data stored online is subject to the laws, government policies, and regulations of the country or area in which it resides [3]. This principle represents the intersection of territorial jurisdiction and digital information, establishing that data—despite its intangible nature—remains subject to the legal authority of physical locations where it is stored and processed. According to ISACA's research, sovereignty encompasses national authority, regulatory jurisdiction, and legal control frameworks that transcend simple geographic boundaries, extending beyond mere location to encompass questions of legal authority, enforcement mechanisms, and governmental access rights.

Practical implications of data sovereignty vary significantly across jurisdictions and regulatory contexts. Some jurisdictions interpret sovereignty to require that data remain physically within national borders, prohibiting cross-border transfers entirely or subjecting such transfers to explicit approval processes. Other jurisdictions focus less on physical location and more on ensuring that data processing complies with domestic legal requirements regardless of where processing occurs. Still others implement hybrid approaches differentiating between data categories, applying strict localization requirements to sensitive information while permitting freer movement of less sensitive data. These jurisdictional variations create a complex compliance landscape where organizations must navigate divergent and sometimes conflicting requirements across global operations.

Data residency has a similar but distinct meaning. Data residency is mostly concerned with the physical or geographic location of data, rather than who controls the data or where it is regulated. While sovereignty addresses questions of legal authority and regulatory applicability, residency focuses on the practical matter of where data physically resides. Organizations implementing residency controls may specify that data must reside within particular countries, geographic regions, or specific data centers, often using contractual provisions with cloud providers to enforce these location requirements.

The distinction between sovereignty and residency carries significant practical implications. Data residency requirements can often be satisfied through technical controls and contractual commitments, ensuring that data remains within specified geographic boundaries. Sovereignty compliance, however, may require more comprehensive measures addressing not only physical location but also legal jurisdiction over data processing activities, governmental access rights, and applicable regulatory frameworks. An organization might satisfy residency requirements by storing data in specified locations while still facing sovereignty challenges if the cloud provider or data processor remains subject to foreign legal jurisdictions that could compel data access or disclosure.

Jurisdictional compliance consists of the regulatory, legal, and governance compliance requirements of a designated jurisdiction—legal territory or regulatory area. This encompasses a broad spectrum of requirements including data protection regulations (GDPR, CCPA, LGPD), sector-specific mandates (HIPAA for healthcare, GLBA for financial services, FERPA for education), data localization laws,

cybersecurity requirements, breach notification obligations, and individual rights provisions such as data access, portability, and deletion rights.

The complexity of jurisdictional compliance in multi-cloud environments stems from several factors. Organizations often operate across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, each with its own regulatory framework and enforcement mechanisms. Cloud providers themselves operate across multiple jurisdictions, potentially subjecting customer data to legal authorities of countries where the provider maintains infrastructure or corporate presence. Regulatory frameworks frequently overlap, with organizations potentially subject to multiple regulations governing the same data or processing activities. Additionally, regulations continue to evolve rapidly, requiring organizations to maintain ongoing awareness of regulatory changes and adapt their compliance programs accordingly.

Several existing frameworks provide principles for operationalizing multi-cloud governance and sovereignty. The Shared Responsibility Model describes the security and compliance responsibilities of cloud service providers and customers. Under this model, cloud service providers are responsible for the security of the cloud, while customers are responsible for the security in the cloud [6]. This delineation establishes that providers maintain responsibility for physical infrastructure, network architecture, and foundational security of their platforms, while customers bear responsibility for their data, applications, identity and access management, and configuration of provider-supplied security capabilities.

The Shared Responsibility Model has significant implications for sovereignty compliance. While cloud providers may offer technical capabilities supporting sovereignty requirements—such as region selection, encryption services, and access logging—ultimate responsibility for sovereignty compliance rests with the customer organization. Organizations must develop a comprehensive understanding of their sovereignty obligations and actively manage their cloud configurations to satisfy these requirements rather than assuming that provider capabilities alone ensure compliance.

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework defines a high-level framework for managing cybersecurity risk and provides a structure adaptable to sovereignty requirements using its five core functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. Applied to sovereignty governance, the Identify function encompasses developing comprehensive data inventories, mapping data flows across cloud environments, and understanding applicable regulatory requirements. The Protect function includes implementing technical controls such as encryption, access restrictions, and geo-fencing to enforce sovereignty policies. The Detect function involves continuous monitoring of data locations, access patterns, and configuration changes to identify potential sovereignty violations.

The ISO/IEC 27001, 27018, and 27017 information security, privacy and cloud security management standards provide an internationally accepted information security management framework adaptable to sovereignty requirements. Organizations pursuing sovereignty compliance can leverage these standards both for their own governance programs and as criteria for evaluating cloud providers. Provider certifications against these standards offer evidence of baseline security and privacy capabilities, though certification alone does not ensure sovereignty compliance, given the jurisdiction-specific nature of sovereignty requirements.

To achieve sovereignty goals, multi-cloud deployments need to identify, assess and reduce risks accordingly [10]. This risk-based approach recognizes that absolute elimination of sovereignty risk is neither practical nor economically viable for most organizations. Organizations should prioritize their governance resources on the most significant sovereignty risks while accepting managed levels of residual risk for lower-priority scenarios. This can cover legal risks where data may leave the country and lead to violation of data localization requirements, potentially resulting in regulatory penalties, legal liability, reputational damage, or loss of customer trust. Technical risks refer to data flow not complying with data localization policies due to factors such as provider configuration errors, system misconfigurations, or unauthorized administrator actions. Operational risks arise from lack of ownership of sovereignty compliance across business functions, manifesting when sovereignty responsibilities remain ambiguous.

Organizations should apply risk assessment criteria commensurate with their risk appetite, legal and regulatory environment, and business priorities to prioritize governance resources on the most important sovereignty risks. This risk-based prioritization should consider factors including the severity of potential regulatory penalties, the likelihood of enforcement action, the sensitivity and volume of data subject to sovereignty requirements, the complexity of achieving compliance for specific data categories, and the business impact of implementing sovereignty controls. By systematically assessing these factors, organizations can develop risk-informed sovereignty governance strategies that appropriately balance compliance assurance with operational practicality and business value.

Concept	Primary Focus	Scope	Control Mechanism
Multi-Cloud Architecture	Service Distribution	Strategic	Provider Selection
Data Sovereignty	Legal Authority	Legal/Regulatory	Jurisdictional Frameworks
Data Residency	Physical Location	Geographic	Storage Infrastructure
Jurisdictional Compliance	Regulatory Adherence	Technical/Procedural	Local Standards Enforcement

Table 1: Key Data Governance Concepts and Their Scope [3,4, 8]

4. Key Multi-Cloud Challenges

The implementation of data sovereignty controls in multi-cloud environments presents a complex array of challenges spanning legal, technical, and organizational domains. These challenges are not merely additive—they interact and compound each other, creating emergent complexities that exceed the sum of individual challenge areas. Understanding these challenge categories and their interconnections is essential for developing effective sovereignty governance strategies that address root causes rather than merely treating symptoms of sovereignty risk.

In conflict of laws cases, companies operating in multiple jurisdictions may be unable to comply with the data protection laws in more than one jurisdiction simultaneously. These conflicts represent some of the most intractable sovereignty challenges, as they involve fundamental disagreements between sovereign legal authorities rather than technical or operational difficulties that organizations can resolve through architecture or process improvements. Compliance with one jurisdiction's data protection requirements may violate another jurisdiction's laws, such as jurisdictions requiring data to be stored domestically and not accessed externally, which may conflict with jurisdictions' laws requiring disclosure of data from wherever it is stored.

A prominent example involves data localization requirements in jurisdictions like Russia, China, and Vietnam that mandate data about their citizens be stored within national borders and prohibit transfer abroad. Organizations subject to these requirements may simultaneously face obligations under regulations like the U.S. CLOUD Act, which can compel U.S.-based service providers to disclose data stored anywhere in the world in response to legal process, regardless of local data protection laws. European data protection authorities have similarly raised concerns about U.S. government access to data transferred to the United States, leading to invalidation of previous trans-Atlantic data transfer frameworks and ongoing legal uncertainty regarding compliant mechanisms for EU-US data flows.

These challenges can be further complicated in multi-cloud environments due to differing legal jurisdictions of cloud providers, adding more jurisdictional claims to the organization [5]. When an organization uses AWS infrastructure in Frankfurt, Azure services in Amsterdam, and Google Cloud resources in Belgium, data that logically constitutes a single application dataset may be distributed across multiple legal jurisdictions, each with potentially different regulatory requirements and

enforcement priorities. This jurisdictional layering creates scenarios where data processing activities must simultaneously satisfy requirements from multiple jurisdictions including where data subjects reside, where data is physically stored, where the cloud provider is incorporated, and where the customer organization is domiciled.

Another area of GDPR compliance in multi-cloud architectures involves visibility over cross-border data transfers. Research has found that providing enterprises with full visibility over data flows between interconnected cloud services may be challenging [5]. The GDPR establishes strict requirements for data transfers outside the European Economic Area, permitting such transfers only through approved mechanisms. Demonstrating compliance necessitates comprehensive visibility into when, where, and why personal data crosses jurisdictional boundaries—visibility that proves technically challenging in dynamic multi-cloud environments.

Cloud architectures introduce multiple mechanisms through which data may transfer across borders. Explicit cross-region replication configured by organizations represents the most transparent scenario. However, data transfers may also occur through less visible mechanisms: content delivery networks that cache data in edge locations worldwide, DNS resolution that routes traffic through globally distributed infrastructure, backup and disaster recovery systems that replicate data to multiple geographic locations, and cloud provider maintenance activities that temporarily relocate data. Organizations lacking comprehensive visibility into these transfer mechanisms cannot confidently assert GDPR compliance, even when they believe they have configured their environments appropriately.

One of the largest technical hurdles of multi-cloud sovereignty is the problem of data sprawl, or data moving to multiple, often unaccounted-for locations. Data sprawl emerges from the inherent characteristics of cloud computing architecture combined with modern application development and operations practices. Cloud architectures abstract away from physical equipment and dynamically move data stored in their infrastructure to optimize for efficiency and performance advantages. This dynamic optimization occurs automatically and continuously, with cloud provider systems making millisecond-level decisions about data placement, routing, and processing without customer visibility or control.

Application architectures contribute to data sprawl through patterns like microservices that distribute functionality across numerous independent services, event-driven architectures where data propagates through message queues and event streams, and caching layers that replicate data to multiple geographic locations for performance optimization. Development and operations practices further compound sprawl through logging and monitoring that capture and store data replicas, debugging sessions that create temporary data copies, test and development environments that replicate production data, and collaborative tools that synchronize data across team members and geographic locations.

The sovereignty implications of data sprawl are profound. Organizations may implement careful controls over primary data storage locations only to discover that logs, caches, backups, or other secondary copies reside in jurisdictions that violate sovereignty requirements. The distributed nature of multi-cloud architectures exacerbates these challenges, as data sprawl can occur not only within a single provider's infrastructure but also across boundaries between multiple providers, creating inter-cloud data flows that further complicate governance and visibility.

Recent comparative analysis of major cloud service providers has shown that implementation of data protection controls, data residency commitments, and data sovereignty commitments varies substantially across major cloud service providers [6]. This variation manifests in multiple dimensions, each with significant implications for multi-cloud sovereignty governance. The degree of granularity of regional controls differs substantially across providers, with some offering fine-grained selection of specific data centers or availability zones while others provide only country or multi-country region selection.

Availability of native encryption varies in terms of key management options, encryption algorithm support, and whether encryption applies to data at rest, in transit, or in use. Some providers offer comprehensive bring-your-own-key (BYOK) and hold-your-own-key (HYOK) capabilities enabling organizations to maintain exclusive control over encryption keys, while others provide more limited key management options. Building blocks for access logging and monitoring similarly vary across providers in comprehensiveness, granularity, and ease of integration with compliance workflows.

Sovereignty-specific features have emerged as a distinct category of provider offerings, with major providers increasingly developing specialized capabilities targeting sovereignty requirements. Organizations adopting multi-cloud architectures are unable to employ a single approach to sovereignty controls and must adapt their governance to the limitations and strengths of each service provider [7]. This provider heterogeneity creates significant governance challenges, as organizations cannot develop uniform sovereignty control implementations but must instead maintain provider-specific approaches that account for capability differences.

Governance maturity challenges are prevalent as well. Few organizations have a complete understanding of their data inventories, including what kinds of data are being captured, where data is being stored, how data is being moved from one system to another, and what regulations apply to the data [9]. This lack of data understanding represents a fundamental impediment to sovereignty governance, as effective controls require comprehensive knowledge of what data exists and how it flows through systems. The challenge of building comprehensive data inventories is compounded by the distributed nature of data ownership in modern organizations, where data may be created and managed by business units operating with significant autonomy, development teams building applications with minimal central oversight, and individual employees creating unstructured data through daily work activities.

There is insufficient clarity regarding which cloud teams, legal teams, compliance functions, and business teams are responsible for ensuring sovereignty compliance. This accountability ambiguity manifests in several patterns. Effective sovereignty governance requires clear assignment of responsibilities spanning policy definition, technical implementation, ongoing monitoring, incident response, and executive oversight. Organizations that fail to clearly delineate these responsibilities create governance gaps where critical activities occur inconsistently or not at all.

There is a high operational burden of managing multiple cloud provider relationships and ensuring consistent sovereignty compliance since each relationship involves distinct negotiations, integrations, operations, and governance [10]. Multi-cloud deployments multiply these efforts across providers, with each relationship requiring dedicated investment in contractual negotiations, technical integrations, staff training, and monitoring systems. These activities consume significant organizational resources and create operational costs that partially offset the financial benefits multi-cloud strategies promise.

Challenge Category	Challenge Type	Primary Impact Area	Complexity Level
Conflicting Regulations	Legal	Cross-Border Compliance	Critical
Data Transfer Visibility	Technical	GDPR Compliance	High
Data Sprawl	Technical	Location Awareness	Critical
Provider Disparities	Technical	Control Implementation	High
Governance Maturity	Organizational	Data Inventory	Medium
Accountability Gaps	Organizational	Responsibility Assignment	High

Table 2: Multi-Cloud Sovereignty Challenge Categories and Impact Assessment [4, 5, 6, 9, 10]

5. Governance Models

The selection and implementation of appropriate governance models represents a critical strategic decision for organizations pursuing multi-cloud sovereignty compliance. Governance models establish the fundamental structure through which sovereignty policies are defined, communicated, implemented, monitored, and enforced across the organization's multi-cloud estate. The choice of governance model profoundly impacts organizational agility, compliance assurance, resource requirements, and the ability to adapt to evolving regulatory landscapes.

Centralized governance refers to the use of a single organizational governance body to set governance policies, standards, and controls for a multi-cloud estate [7]. This includes determining approved cloud service providers, mandated regions for data residency, and required security and sovereignty controls for specific data types. Under centralized governance, a dedicated function—often a Cloud Center of Excellence (CCoE), Enterprise Architecture group, or Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) organization—maintains authority over cloud strategy, provider selection, architecture patterns, and compliance requirements.

The centralized model typically establishes comprehensive policy frameworks addressing all dimensions of multi-cloud governance. These frameworks specify approved cloud providers and services, establish regional restrictions identifying approved and prohibited data center locations based on sovereignty requirements, and define technical control baselines specifying required security configurations, encryption requirements, access control standards, and monitoring capabilities.

The centralization of sovereignty requirements interpretation and enforcement across the organization can provide several business advantages for sovereignty compliance, including a uniform approach to policy, improved visibility and control of compliance efforts, and better utilization of specialized expertise [9]. Policy uniformity ensures that sovereignty requirements are interpreted and applied consistently across the organization, reducing compliance gaps. Central governance functions can establish consistent metrics for sovereignty compliance, aggregate compliance data from diverse sources, and provide executive leadership with unified views of organizational sovereignty posture. Sovereignty compliance requires specialized knowledge spanning regulatory requirements, cloud provider capabilities, and technical implementation approaches. Centralized governance enables organizations to concentrate expertise in dedicated functions, allowing specialized professionals to develop deep knowledge and apply it consistently across the organization.

Centralized governance has several challenges especially in large and complex multi-cloud environments. The main challenge is that it creates decision-making bottlenecks, as all cloud decisions must go through a central authority, which can slow down the pace of innovation and deployment [8]. Development teams may experience significant delays waiting for central governance review and approval of cloud architecture proposals, provider service selections, or deployment configurations. These delays can frustrate innovation and create incentives for shadow IT where teams bypass governance processes to maintain development velocity.

Scaling limitations represent another significant challenge. As organizations grow their multi-cloud estates, the volume of governance decisions requiring central review can exceed the capacity of centralized functions to process them timely. Context awareness challenges further complicate centralized governance, as central governance functions operate at a distance from specific applications, workloads, and business contexts. This distance can result in governance decisions that, while technically compliant with sovereignty policies, prove suboptimal for specific use cases.

Federated governance describes the governance model in which policies are centrally defined but implementation is delegated to federated teams who are closer to the level of application and workloads. A systematic literature review of cloud computing governance models has shown that federated governance models provide an appropriate trade-off between centralized and decentralized governance models in multi-cloud environments [7]. Federated approaches attempt to combine the policy consistency benefits of centralization with the agility and contextual awareness advantages of distributed decision-making.

Under federated governance, central functions retain responsibility for establishing high-level sovereignty policies, defining compliance requirements, setting control objectives, and providing governance frameworks and standards. Implementation teams—typically organized by business unit, product line, or application portfolio—accept responsibility for implementing these centrally defined policies within their domains. These teams make detailed technical decisions about how to configure cloud resources, which specific provider services to use, and how to architect applications for sovereignty compliance within their specific contexts.

In practice, the model assumes that local implementation teams that touch the workloads know the application's requirements, data flows, and operational constraints better than centralized governance functions, and so are in the best position to make implementation decisions. This assumption recognizes that sovereignty implementation often requires nuanced judgments that depend on specific application characteristics. Federated governance enables implementation teams to innovate within guardrails rather than seeking approval for every decision, accelerating deployment velocity while maintaining sovereignty compliance.

Effective federated governance requires mechanisms to ensure that implementation teams fulfill their sovereignty responsibilities through accountability, automated compliance checks, audits, and escalation processes for non-compliance situations [9]. Accountability mechanisms must clearly define which teams bear responsibility for specific aspects of sovereignty compliance, establish metrics for measuring compliance performance, and create consequences for non-compliance. Automated compliance checking becomes essential in federated models to provide central governance functions with visibility into implementation team compliance despite distributed decision-making. Policy-as-code implementations can continuously validate that team deployments conform to sovereignty requirements, automatically detecting violations and alerting both implementation teams and central governance functions.

Automated governance relies on policy-as-code, infrastructure-as-code, and continuous compliance monitoring to enable the programmatic enforcement of sovereignty requirements across the multi-cloud estate [9]. Unlike manual governance where sovereignty requirements are noted and acted upon by human actors, automated governance embeds sovereignty requirements into the deployment pipeline, infrastructure provisioning, and operational monitoring activities. This represents a fundamental shift from governance as a separate review and approval process to governance as an integral component of the technical systems that provision and manage cloud infrastructure.

Policy-as-code implementations translate regulatory requirements into executable rules expressed in policy languages and enforced by policy engines. Policy engines continuously check whether infrastructure, data locations and access patterns conform to sovereignty policy and block non-compliant deployments and configurations [10]. Popular policy-as-code frameworks supporting automated governance include Open Policy Agent (OPA), HashiCorp Sentinel, Cloud Custodian, and provider-specific policy frameworks like AWS Service Control Policies, Azure Policy, and Google Cloud Organization Policy Service.

Infrastructure-as-code practices support automated governance by defining infrastructure through declarative code rather than manual configuration. When infrastructure definitions pass through policy-as-code validation before deployment, organizations can ensure sovereignty compliance is verified before resources are provisioned rather than discovering violations after deployment. This "shift-left" approach to governance identifies compliance issues early in the development lifecycle when remediation is simple and inexpensive.

Continuous compliance monitoring complements policy enforcement by providing ongoing verification that operational environments remain compliant despite dynamic changes. While policy-as-code prevents non-compliant initial deployments, continuous monitoring detects configuration drift, unauthorized changes, and emergent compliance violations that may arise from system evolution, provider changes, or external factors.

Automating governance can provide considerably better coverage and reliability than manual governance, because policy engines can continuously check enormous multi-cloud deployments in a way that is not practical for human teams to do manually. Automated governance evaluates every resource continuously, achieving both comprehensive coverage and temporal consistency. The reliability benefits extend beyond coverage to include consistency and objectivity, as automated policy engines apply rules identically across all evaluations, ensuring uniform enforcement of sovereignty requirements.

However, automated governance also presents challenges. Policy-as-code implementations require significant upfront investment to translate regulatory requirements into executable rules, develop and test policy code, and integrate policy engines into deployment pipelines. Sovereignty requirements expressed in legal language often prove ambiguous or contextual, requiring interpretation that resists straightforward encoding into rules. Organizations must also maintain manual governance capabilities for scenarios that cannot be fully automated, such as evaluating novel architectures or assessing exception requests.

Governance Model	Authority Structure	Decision Speed	Scalability	Compliance Assurance
Centralized	Single Authority	Low	Limited	Very High
Federated	Shared Responsibility	High	Excellent	High
Automated	Policy-as-Code	Very High	Excellent	Very High

Table 3: Multi-Cloud Governance Model Comparison Matrix [7, 9]

6. Technical Strategies for Sovereignty and Compliance

Achieving data sovereignty compliance in multi-cloud environments requires implementing comprehensive technical strategies that address data location control, processing constraints, encryption protection, and architectural segmentation. These technical strategies translate sovereignty policy requirements into operational controls that can be consistently enforced across heterogeneous cloud platforms, diverse application architectures, and dynamic operational environments.

Geo-fencing is implemented using technical safeguard measures that prevent data from being transferred outside of pre-identified geographic boundaries or jurisdictions [8]. Organizations define boundaries and implement technical controls to prevent data transfer. Geo-fencing operates through multiple technical mechanisms working in concert to enforce geographic constraints. Network-level controls implement geo-fencing through network segmentation, firewall rules, and routing policies that restrict data flows to approved geographic regions.

In multi-cloud contexts, geo-fencing may be implemented by selecting provider regions in countries/jurisdictions, configuring provider services' settings to disable cross-region replication, and configuring network controls to prohibit cross-border egress from all regions being employed. Region selection represents the foundation of geo-fencing, as organizations must initially deploy resources only in provider regions located within approved jurisdictions. Service configuration controls complement region selection by disabling features that might move data outside geo-fenced boundaries. Many cloud services include capabilities for cross-region replication, global content distribution, or automatic failover to alternate regions—features that conflict with geo-fencing requirements.

Geo-fencing can meet data localization requirements by keeping data within the borders of a single country or group of countries. Jurisdictions including Russia, China, Vietnam, and Indonesia have implemented data localization laws requiring that specified categories of data about their citizens or

residents be stored within national borders. Geo-fencing provides the primary technical mechanism for satisfying these requirements, ensuring that subject data never leaves the specified jurisdiction.

Edge computing has the potential to adequately satisfy sovereignty requirements through processing and storage performed where data is generated or consumed. Edge architectures deploy computing resources geographically proximate to data sources—such as manufacturing facilities, retail locations, IoT deployments, or user populations—enabling data to be processed locally rather than transmitted to centralized cloud regions. Edge computing can provide important benefits to sovereignty by capturing, processing, and storing data in the jurisdiction it was created, preventing the need to move data from one jurisdiction to another.

The sovereignty advantages of edge computing stem from several characteristics. Data processing occurs at the point of generation, meaning sensitive data can be filtered, aggregated, or anonymized before any cross-border transmission occurs. Organizations can implement edge architectures where raw data remains perpetually within its source jurisdiction, with only processed insights, aggregated statistics, or anonymized information transmitted to central systems. However, edge computing introduces significant operational complexity, requiring organizations to manage geographically dispersed edge infrastructure, maintain operational consistency across numerous edge locations, and implement security and monitoring at edge sites that may lack physical security protections.

Microservices architectures decompose applications into small independently deployable services that expose APIs, allowing for fine-grained control over the hosting of application services and their associated operational data. For example, organizations may deploy services to process sensitive personal data in jurisdictions with strict data protection laws while deploying services to process non-sensitive data elsewhere [8]. This architectural approach enables organizations to segment applications based on data sensitivity and sovereignty requirements rather than treating entire applications as monolithic units subject to uniform governance.

Microservices sovereignty implementations typically establish service classification schemes identifying which services process sovereignty-restricted data and which handle only non-restricted information. Services processing restricted data are deployed exclusively in approved jurisdictions with appropriate sovereignty controls, while services handling unrestricted data may be deployed more flexibly to optimize for performance, cost, or other operational concerns. API gateway patterns provide technical mechanisms for enforcing sovereignty boundaries in microservices architectures, inspecting requests to identify data classification and routing requests to appropriate service instances based on data sovereignty requirements.

Encryption is a technical control that can be used for data sovereignty when data resides in a poorly governed jurisdiction or with a completely untrusted cloud service provider, in which case key ownership is the key aspect [9]. Encryption-based sovereignty approaches recognize that data stored in encrypted form may be physically located in jurisdictions with unfavorable sovereignty characteristics, yet remain effectively sovereign if encryption keys are maintained under exclusive organizational control and never provided to the cloud provider or other parties subject to foreign legal jurisdiction.

Customer-managed keys allow organizations to maintain encryption keys outside the reach of cloud providers. All major cloud providers offer customer-managed key capabilities where organizations generate and store encryption keys using their own key management infrastructure or third-party key management services, with cloud providers encrypting data using these customer-supplied keys. Technical controls can ensure that regardless of where data is replicated in a jurisdiction with undesirable legal frameworks, data access is not possible without the organization's permission.

Encryption strategies that extend the notion of sovereignty include bring-your-own-key (BYOK) and hold-your-own-key (HYOK) [10]. BYOK implementations allow organizations to generate encryption keys using their own key generation processes rather than provider-supplied key generation services, then import these keys into provider key management systems. HYOK implementations go further by maintaining keys exclusively in customer-controlled infrastructure with cloud providers never

possessing key material. Providers must request key operations from customer key management systems for each operation, ensuring absolute key custody remains with the organization.

Confidential computing is a recent technology that allows for the encryption of data while in use. Traditional encryption protects data at rest and in transit but requires data to be decrypted during processing, creating potential exposure during active computation. Intel SGX, AMD SEV, ARM TrustZone enclaves and other similar technologies operate by performing all computations over encrypted data and encrypting the results when they are in memory of special protected hardware environments that execute the operations. These hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) create isolated computing spaces where data and code are protected from the underlying operating system, hypervisor, and even cloud provider administrators.

Confidential computing enables sovereignty-preserving cloud computing even when infrastructure resides in untrusted jurisdictions or is managed by untrusted parties. Code and data loaded into confidential computing enclaves remain encrypted and inaccessible to any entities outside the enclave, including privileged system administrators, hypervisor software, or governmental authorities with physical access to servers. However, confidential computing remains an emerging technology with significant limitations including performance overhead from encryption and isolation mechanisms, limited size of trusted execution environments, and varying provider support.

Most large cloud providers have several options to accommodate sovereignty requirements, including AWS Regions with fine-grained controls, Azure Geography with customer-managed keys, and Google Cloud Platform Organization Policy Service to apply programmatic constraints on resource locations [6]. AWS provides the most granular geographic controls with numerous regions worldwide, each comprising multiple availability zones. Azure organizes infrastructure into geographies representing regulatory boundaries, with each geography containing multiple regions. Google Cloud Platform implements organization policy service providing centralized policy management across the GCP resource hierarchy, enabling enforcement of sovereignty requirements through technical policy rather than procedural controls.

Technical Strategy	Primary Function	Sovereignty Benefit	Implementation Complexity
Geo-Fencing	Geographic Restriction	Prevents Cross-Border Transfers	Medium
Edge Computing	Local Processing	Jurisdictional Data Containment	High
Microservices Architecture	Service Segmentation	Fine-Grained Location Control	High
Encryption (Customer-Managed Keys)	Data Protection	Key Control Independence	Medium
Advanced Encryption (BYOK/HYOK)	Enhanced Key Management	Maximum Sovereignty Protection	High
Confidential Computing	Data-in-Use Protection	Hardware-Based Security	Very High

Table 4: Technical Strategies for Multi-Cloud Data Sovereignty Compliance [7-10, 12]

7. Models for Assessing Risk

Assessing risk within multi-cloud environments requires organizations to address a broad spectrum of concerns that encompass traditional cybersecurity threats, as well as jurisdictional, regulatory, and sovereignty-related risks. This comprehensive approach ensures that organizations are not only

defending against technical vulnerabilities but are also considering the complex legal and operational landscape of multi-cloud deployments. Risk assessment for multi-cloud sovereignty extends beyond conventional information security risk analysis to incorporate legal liability, regulatory compliance, reputational exposure, and operational continuity considerations that arise from the jurisdictional complexities of distributed cloud architectures.

Effective sovereignty risk assessment requires organizations to develop comprehensive risk models that integrate multiple analytical perspectives. Technical risk analysis examines vulnerabilities in cloud architectures, configurations, and controls that might enable sovereignty violations. Legal risk analysis evaluates exposure to regulatory enforcement, civil liability, and contractual breach arising from sovereignty non-compliance. Operational risk analysis considers the business impacts of sovereignty compliance failures including service disruptions, customer loss, and strategic constraints. Financial risk analysis quantifies the potential costs of sovereignty violations including regulatory penalties, litigation expenses, remediation costs, and business impacts.

A central component of this process is the Data Sovereignty Impact Assessment (DSIA). The DSIA offers a systematic way to map data flows, enabling organizations to gain a clear understanding of where their data resides, how it moves, and which legal obligations apply across geographic boundaries. By identifying exposures associated with cross-border data transfers, organizations can proactively manage risks that might otherwise lead to non-compliance or breaches of local regulations. The DSIA methodology typically proceeds through several phases, each building upon the previous to develop progressively more detailed understanding of sovereignty risk exposure.

The data inventory phase establishes comprehensive catalogs of data holdings, documenting what data the organization collects, processes, and stores. Data inventories classify information by type (personal data, financial records, intellectual property, operational data), sensitivity (public, internal, confidential, restricted), regulatory applicability (GDPR-subject, HIPAA-protected), and business criticality. Organizations without mature data inventory capabilities often discover through DSIA that their data holdings far exceed their awareness, with shadow IT systems, forgotten databases, and decentralized data stores containing significant volumes of unknown data.

The data flow mapping phase traces how data moves through organizational systems, across cloud providers, between geographic regions, and through processing stages. Flow mapping identifies data sources, processing locations, storage repositories, transmission paths, and data recipients. For sovereignty assessment, geographic characteristics of data flows prove particularly critical—understanding which data crosses international borders, which jurisdictions it traverses, and under what legal authorities different processing activities occur enables identification of sovereignty risks.

The jurisdiction analysis phase determines which legal authorities govern specific data elements and processing activities. This analysis identifies applicable regulations based on data subject location, data controller jurisdiction, data processor location, and where processing activities occur. Jurisdiction analysis often reveals overlapping or conflicting legal obligations where data processing must simultaneously satisfy requirements from multiple authorities.

The risk identification phase catalogs specific sovereignty risks arising from the organization's data practices. Risks might include data localization violations where data subject to location restrictions resides in prohibited jurisdictions, unauthorized transfer risks where data crosses borders without adequate legal basis, access control violations where personnel in restricted jurisdictions can access protected data, and provider jurisdiction risks where cloud provider legal jurisdiction creates exposure to foreign governmental access.

In addition to mapping data flows, risk assessment models are strengthened by evaluating the maturity of controls implemented by cloud service providers. Aligning these controls with established compliance standards—such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), ISO 27018, or the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines—provides a measurable benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of security and privacy measures. This alignment not only improves risk

scoring but also helps ensure that operational practices meet both organizational and regulatory expectations.

Provider control assessment examines the security, privacy, and sovereignty capabilities that cloud service providers offer. Organizations should systematically evaluate provider controls against relevant frameworks including SOC 2 Type II reports assessing security, availability, and confidentiality controls; ISO 27001 certifications demonstrating information security management systems; ISO 27018 certifications addressing privacy controls for cloud service providers processing personal data; and industry-specific certifications such as HITRUST for healthcare or PCI DSS for payment card data.

Control gap analysis identifies discrepancies between organizational sovereignty requirements and provider-implemented controls. Some gaps may be addressable through customer-implemented controls—for example, providers lacking native data classification capabilities can be supplemented with customer-implemented tagging and classification systems. Other gaps may represent fundamental limitations requiring architectural mitigation. Critical gaps that cannot be addressed through supplementary controls or architectural adaptation may disqualify providers from consideration for sovereignty-sensitive workloads.

Emerging threat vectors must also be taken into account. These include risks originating from government access mandates, evolving geopolitical developments, and the varying degrees of transparency offered by different cloud providers. Government access risks arise from legal authorities that enable governmental entities to compel data disclosure, potentially circumventing sovereignty protections. The U.S. CLOUD Act enables American law enforcement to require U.S. service providers to disclose data stored anywhere in the world, regardless of local data protection laws. Similar authorities exist in many jurisdictions, with varying transparency requirements, oversight mechanisms, and limitations.

Geopolitical risks encompass how international relations, trade disputes, and diplomatic conflicts might impact cloud operations and sovereignty compliance. Trade restrictions might prohibit data flows to or from specific countries, international sanctions might require providers to cease operations in particular jurisdictions, and diplomatic conflicts might prompt governments to demand data localization or provider nationality restrictions.

To facilitate the identification of potential compromises, organizations can employ established frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK for cloud threat modeling. These frameworks support the analysis of risks related to misconfigurations, inter-cloud networking complexities, and the challenges of identity federation. By adopting a structured approach to threat modeling, organizations can uncover hidden vulnerabilities and address them before they are exploited.

Cloud-specific threat modeling using MITRE ATT&CK enables organizations to systematically examine how attackers might compromise sovereignty controls. Misconfiguration risks represent particularly significant threats to sovereignty in multi-cloud environments, as cloud services typically default to configurations optimizing for availability and accessibility rather than sovereignty compliance. Inter-cloud networking complexity creates attack surfaces and compliance risks as data flows between multiple cloud providers traverse various network paths, potentially crossing jurisdictional boundaries.

Ultimately, an effective risk assessment model within multi-cloud environments should integrate an analysis of technical vulnerabilities, legal liabilities, and operational challenges. By doing so, organizations are equipped with an accurate and actionable perspective on sovereignty-related risks, enhancing their ability to maintain compliance and protect critical data assets in a rapidly evolving landscape. Risk quantification methodologies enable organizations to estimate the likelihood and impact of sovereignty risks in comparable terms. Risk prioritization frameworks help organizations focus limited resources on the most significant sovereignty risks, while risk treatment decisions flow from prioritization, with organizations selecting among risk avoidance, risk mitigation, risk transfer, and risk acceptance strategies.

8. Case Studies

Examining real-world implementations of multi-cloud sovereignty governance provides valuable insights into how organizations translate sovereignty requirements into operational practices, navigate the challenges of multi-provider environments, and achieve compliance while maintaining business agility. The following case studies illustrate diverse approaches to sovereignty governance across different industries, regulatory contexts, and organizational structures.

Financial Services: Multinational Banking Institution

The financial services industry faces strict data sovereignty and compliance requirements including GLBA, PCI DSS, and jurisdiction-specific banking regulations. A multinational bank undertaking core banking modernization navigated complex regulatory oversight across North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. The institution operated under U.S. Federal Reserve and OCC regulations, European Banking Authority directives, and various national banking authorities, each imposing distinct requirements for data residency, cross-border transfers, and third-party oversight.

The bank's digital transformation initiative aimed to migrate from legacy on-premises systems to cloud infrastructure, modernize core banking applications using microservices architectures, and leverage advanced analytics and machine learning for risk management and customer insight. However, regulatory constraints significantly shaped the transformation approach. European regulators required that European customer personal data remain within EU borders except under specific limited circumstances, while several Asian jurisdictions imposed absolute data localization requirements prohibiting any cross-border transfer of citizen financial data.

The institution chose AWS for analytics services, Azure for enterprise integration, and Google Cloud for data analytics services. This multi-cloud provider selection reflected both technical and sovereignty considerations. The bank's governance for cloud use was a hybrid between centralized policy and federated implementation [7]. A central Cloud Governance Office was created, which established enterprise-wide sovereignty policies including data classification, restrictions on geographic regions and specific services, encryption and access control requirements.

The Cloud Governance Office published comprehensive governance standards including a data classification framework categorizing data into public, internal, confidential, and restricted tiers based on regulatory applicability and business sensitivity, a cloud region matrix specifying which provider regions were approved for each data classification tier, a cloud service catalog identifying approved and prohibited services by provider, and technical control baselines defining required security configurations, encryption standards, access control requirements, and monitoring capabilities.

Local cloud engineering teams adapted and implemented these policies in their respective regions, leveraging their understanding of local regulations and respective cloud providers' capabilities. Regional teams in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America operated with significant implementation autonomy within the centrally defined governance framework. Techniques included geo-fencing controls, customer-managed encryption keys, and zero-trust architecture principles. Geo-fencing implementation utilized cloud-native network controls including VPC configurations preventing cross-region connectivity, firewall rules blocking outbound traffic to non-approved regions, and provider service configurations disabling cross-region replication.

Manufacturing: Global Automotive Manufacturer

A global automotive manufacturer implemented a multi-cloud strategy according to its business units: AWS IoT for manufacturing operations, Azure for product design with CAD integration, and Google Cloud for supply chain operations analytics [8]. The manufacturer's cloud strategy reflected the distinct technical requirements and competitive positioning of different business functions. Manufacturing operations required robust IoT capabilities for connecting factory equipment, real-time data ingestion from production lines, and analytics for predictive maintenance and quality control.

The manufacturer implemented a sovereign cloud approach for the most sensitive parts of its intellectual property. Automotive design data represents extraordinarily valuable intellectual

property, with new vehicle designs requiring billions of dollars in development investment and representing competitive differentiation in the marketplace. All core product designs are held in sovereign environments and are only operated within the jurisdiction of the company headquarters. The manufacturer established dedicated cloud regions within Germany exclusively for product design data, implemented contractual provisions requiring that cloud provider personnel accessing design environment infrastructure be German nationals subject to German security clearance, and deployed additional encryption layers beyond standard cloud encryption using hardware security modules physically located in company facilities.

Data is encrypted with keys controlled solely by company personnel. The manufacturer implemented hold-your-own-key architecture where design data stored in Azure remained encrypted with keys maintained in HSMs within company-controlled data centers. Sovereignty challenges for the connected factory initiative were addressed through the use of an edge computing architecture, where operational data is processed locally in the connected factory or facility to develop insights, with no transfer of raw data [7]. Connected factories generate massive volumes of operational data from sensors monitoring equipment status, production metrics, quality measurements, and environmental conditions.

The manufacturer deployed edge computing infrastructure at each factory location, processing operational data locally to generate actionable insights. Edge systems performed real-time analytics identifying equipment anomalies, quality deviations, or production inefficiencies, enabling immediate corrective action without dependence on cloud connectivity. Only aggregated, anonymized insights were transmitted to central cloud systems for enterprise-wide analytics, ensuring that raw operational data remained perpetually within the jurisdiction of origin.

Healthcare: Multi-National Healthcare System

Healthcare organizations face stringent sovereignty requirements where patient data must remain within national borders with no foreign access. A multi-national European healthcare organization providing services from primary care through specialized treatments encountered particularly strict requirements under GDPR supplemented by country-specific health data protection laws. Many European jurisdictions treat health data as absolutely protected, prohibiting cross-border transfer except under narrow circumstances.

The organization used sovereign clouds built for the sole purpose of government, i.e., AWS GovCloud and Azure Government, that provide additional guarantees around sovereignty, such as only in-country people managing the infrastructure and the infrastructure physically and logically separated from commercial clouds [6]. Sovereign cloud offerings provide enhanced sovereignty assurances beyond standard cloud regions through several mechanisms including infrastructure physical separation ensuring that sovereign cloud data centers maintain no physical connectivity to commercial cloud networks, logical isolation implementing strict network segmentation, and personnel restrictions ensuring that only personnel who are citizens of and physically located within the sovereign jurisdiction can access sovereign cloud infrastructure.

Pharmaceuticals: Clinical Trials in Multi-Cloud

Pharmaceutical research presents unique sovereignty challenges from global clinical trials, diverse regulatory requirements across jurisdictions, and sensitive participant data. A multinational pharmaceutical company conducting trials across dozens of countries must satisfy FDA requirements in the United States, EMA in Europe, and numerous national health authorities simultaneously. The company uses AWS for genomics, Azure for clinical trial data management, and Google Cloud for AI/ML analysis [8].

For AI/ML, the pharmaceutical company adopted federated learning approaches to deal with sovereignty challenges of crossing data boundaries and aggregating learning of models while using local data for training [12]. Federated learning enables machine learning model training across distributed datasets without requiring data centralization, addressing sovereignty challenges where regulatory requirements prohibit aggregating clinical trial data from multiple jurisdictions into single

repositories. In federated learning implementations, machine learning models are trained locally on datasets within each jurisdiction, with only model parameters—not raw data—shared between sites.

The pharmaceutical company's federated learning architecture deployed training infrastructure in each region conducting clinical trials, trained models locally on clinical trial data from participants in that region, and aggregated model updates from multiple regions to construct global models benefiting from learnings across all trials. This approach enabled the company to develop machine learning models leveraging global clinical trial data while satisfying sovereignty requirements that prohibited transferring individual participant data across borders.

9. Emerging Trends

The landscape of data sovereignty and multi-cloud governance continues to evolve rapidly, driven by technological innovation, regulatory developments, and changing market dynamics. Understanding emerging trends enables organizations to anticipate future requirements, position their sovereignty governance programs for adaptability, and leverage new capabilities as they mature.

After rapid growth in the sovereign cloud market, sovereignty is now among the criteria with which organizations and governments measure cloud solutions, in addition to price and performance [6]. The sovereign cloud market has grown from a niche offering serving specific government customers to a mainstream consideration influencing provider strategy and customer procurement decisions across industries and sectors. Market analyst firms estimate the sovereign cloud market at tens of billions of dollars currently and project continued rapid growth as sovereignty requirements expand globally.

Major cloud providers have expanded their offerings with dedicated services to meet strong sovereignty requirements. AWS has expanded GovCloud regions beyond initial U.S. regions to additional countries, while Microsoft announced its Microsoft Cloud for Sovereignty and Google Cloud is working on Assured Workloads. These expanded offerings reflect provider recognition that sovereignty represents not merely a compliance checkbox but a fundamental requirement for capturing certain market segments and expanding into regulated industries and geographies.

Microsoft Cloud for Sovereignty represents a comprehensive platform designed specifically for government and critical infrastructure customers requiring maximum sovereignty assurance. The platform provides cryptographic control enabling customers to maintain exclusive access to decryption keys, restricted network access preventing data egress from customer-defined boundaries, enhanced transparency through comprehensive audit logging and provider activity visibility, and commitments about data processing within customer-specified boundaries. Microsoft has partnered with local cloud providers in various markets to deliver Cloud for Sovereignty through locally-operated infrastructure, addressing preferences in some jurisdictions for domestic provider operations.

Google Cloud's Assured Workloads provides sovereignty controls integrated into the broader Google Cloud platform rather than separate sovereign regions. This approach enables customers to apply sovereignty requirements to specific workloads within standard Google Cloud regions, providing flexibility to segment workloads by sovereignty requirements without maintaining entirely separate environments. These sovereign cloud offerings typically include staff being locally based, services working on dedicated hardware separated from commercial services, and customers having visibility into governance processes.

Besides offerings provided by hyperscaler sovereign product lines, regional cloud service providers like OVHcloud in Europe and several national clouds are also considered native sovereign service providers, operating entirely in one country or otherwise pre-defined jurisdiction [7]. Regional providers position sovereignty as a core differentiator versus hyperscale cloud providers, emphasizing benefits including domestic ownership not subject to foreign legal jurisdiction, operations exclusively within national borders satisfying absolute localization requirements, alignment with national digital sovereignty policies, and service development responsive to local market requirements.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies are being employed for automating sovereignty compliance processes that would otherwise require large amounts of human effort. These include automated policy translation, continuous compliance monitoring by analyzing system configuration and data flow, and anomaly detection to detect deviations from expected behaviors that may indicate a possible sovereignty compliance violation [9]. AI-driven automation addresses the scale challenges that make manual sovereignty governance increasingly impractical as multi-cloud environments grow in complexity.

Automated policy translation uses natural language processing to analyze regulatory texts, identify requirements relevant to cloud deployments, and generate technical policy specifications encoding these requirements. Natural language processing systems can analyze regulatory texts and identify relevant requirements, which can be translated to technical policy rules. Continuous compliance monitoring leverages machine learning to analyze vast volumes of cloud configuration data, network flow logs, access logs, and operational telemetry. Machine learning systems can classify data based on its content and context in which it would be used [10], enabling automated detection of sovereignty violations such as regulated data appearing in unauthorized locations or unexpected data transfer patterns indicating potential compliance breaches.

The most important trend driving data sovereignty is regulatory convergence between jurisdictions. Broad comparative studies of cross-border data flow policies have shown that regional regulatory frameworks are slowly converging on common baseline rules regarding privacy and sovereignty [11]. While significant regulatory differences persist, analysis of regulatory evolution demonstrates increasing commonality in fundamental principles including requirements for lawful basis for data processing, individual rights to access and control personal data, data minimization principles limiting collection to necessary information, security safeguards protecting data from unauthorized access, and accountability mechanisms requiring organizations to demonstrate compliance.

In addition to substantive harmonization, regulatory interoperability frameworks such as the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules framework, and various cross-border agreements between related jurisdictions aim to ease transborder data flows. The OECD Privacy Guidelines establish internationally recognized principles for privacy protection, serving as foundational reference for national privacy legislation worldwide. The APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system provides a mechanism for certifying organizations' privacy practices as meeting APEC privacy principles, enabling certified organizations to transfer data between APEC member economies more freely than otherwise permitted.

Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies are candidate technologies to improve transparency and auditability of data sovereignty compliance in multi-cloud environments [10]. Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies create immutable and transparent records of transactions or events that can be used to provide verifiable proof of sovereignty controls and compliance activities. The immutability of blockchain records ensures that compliance audit trails cannot be altered after the fact, providing regulators and stakeholders with high-confidence evidence of organizational compliance practices.

Sovereignty use cases for blockchain include creating and storing audit trails of each time sovereignty-protected data has been accessed, cryptographically verifying data movement between jurisdictions, and enforcing verifiable chains of custody as data passes through different processing systems. Blockchain-based access logging creates cryptographically secured records of every access to sovereignty-protected data, documenting who accessed what data, when access occurred, from which location, and under which authorization. Smart contracts running in distributed blockchain platforms can be used to enforce sovereignty policies by checking proposals against policy before persisting them in the blockchain [12].

However, blockchain applications for sovereignty compliance face several challenges including performance limitations as blockchain transaction processing typically exhibits lower throughput than traditional databases, scalability constraints as blockchain networks can struggle with high

transaction volumes, privacy concerns as traditional blockchain architectures maintain public visibility into all transactions which may conflict with confidentiality requirements, and regulatory uncertainty as blockchain-based compliance mechanisms remain novel with limited regulatory guidance on their acceptability. Organizations exploring blockchain for sovereignty compliance should pilot implementations carefully, maintain conventional compliance mechanisms as backstops, and engage proactively with regulators to demonstrate blockchain approaches' effectiveness.

10. Discussion

The comprehensive examination of data sovereignty in multi-cloud environments presented throughout this article reveals several critical insights with significant implications for organizations navigating the complex intersection of cloud adoption and regulatory compliance. The discussion synthesizes key findings across governance models, technical strategies, risk assessment frameworks, and emerging trends to articulate principles that should guide organizational approaches to multi-cloud sovereignty governance.

This research explored data sovereignty for multi-cloud and identified key issues for adopting multi-cloud governance. It concluded that organizations must simultaneously address legal, technical and organizational aspects of governance to achieve data sovereignty, as no single aspect is sufficient on its own [3][4][5]. This integrated requirement represents a fundamental characteristic of sovereignty governance that distinguishes it from more narrowly scoped compliance challenges. Legal analysis alone, while necessary for understanding regulatory obligations, proves insufficient without technical implementation translating requirements into operational controls. Technical controls, no matter how sophisticated, cannot ensure compliance if legal teams fail to accurately interpret regulations or if organizational processes fail to consistently apply controls.

Organizations that practice effective sovereignty governance provide coherence by integrating these aspects into their governance processes. They translate legal obligations into technical controls, implementing specific technologies and configurations that enforce legally required data handling practices. They embed sovereignty as an attribute in organizational technical processes, incorporating compliance requirements into architecture review processes, deployment pipelines, operational monitoring, and incident response procedures rather than treating sovereignty as a separate compliance overlay. They ensure implementation effectiveness through continuous validation, audit mechanisms, and feedback loops that identify gaps and drive corrective action.

The integration challenge extends to organizational structure and culture. Sovereignty governance requires collaboration across traditionally siloed functions including legal counsel interpreting regulatory requirements, compliance teams defining control frameworks, security teams implementing technical safeguards, cloud operations teams configuring infrastructure, application development teams building compliant systems, and business leaders accepting accountability for compliance outcomes.

The choice of cloud provider and architecture is a key determinant of whether sovereignty governance is possible and effective, since sovereignty capabilities vary widely [6]. Provider selection decisions carry long-term implications for sovereignty governance difficulty and effectiveness. Providers offering comprehensive sovereignty capabilities including fine-grained regional controls, robust encryption and key management options, detailed audit logging, and sovereignty-specific service offerings enable more straightforward compliance implementation than providers with limited sovereignty features.

It is advisable to perform sovereignty requirement analysis ahead of provider and architecture selection to understand current and future capability roadmaps, and how important sovereignty features are for providers [7]. Organizations frequently approach cloud adoption with sovereignty as an afterthought, selecting providers and designing architectures based on functional requirements, cost, or existing relationships, only later discovering that sovereignty compliance requires expensive retrofitting or constrains operations in unacceptable ways. Proactive sovereignty analysis conducted

before major provider and architecture commitments enables organizations to evaluate alternatives with clear understanding of compliance implications, select approaches best suited to their sovereignty requirements, negotiate favorable terms addressing sovereignty needs, and architect systems for sovereignty compliance from inception.

The study shows that as multi-cloud environments grow more complex, automation becomes a requirement through policy-as-code, continuous compliance validation, and automated data classification rather than just an added benefit [9][10]. Manual governance approaches that might suffice for small, simple cloud deployments become rapidly overwhelming as environments grow in resource count, provider diversity, deployment velocity, and operational dynamism. Automation addresses these scale challenges by enabling policy enforcement and compliance verification to keep pace with environment growth and change velocity.

However, automation should be viewed as enhancing rather than replacing human governance capabilities. Automated systems lack the contextual understanding, interpretive capability, and judgment that human governance professionals apply when evaluating novel situations, assessing ambiguous requirements, or balancing competing considerations. Effective governance combines automated enforcement of clearly defined policies with human oversight for exceptional cases, policy development, and strategic governance direction.

There is no universally best multi-cloud sovereignty governance model: centralized, federated, and automated models all have advantages and disadvantages. Multi-cloud organizations can select from various governance models depending on factors such as sovereignty requirements, organizational size and heterogeneity, existing governance capabilities, and risk tolerance for regulatory compliance failures [8]. The governance model selection represents a strategic decision with profound implications for organizational agility, compliance assurance, and governance costs.

Centralized governance models suit organizations with relatively straightforward sovereignty requirements, limited cloud deployment diversity, strong central governance functions, and culture comfortable with centralized decision-making authority. Federated governance models suit organizations with heterogeneous operations across business units or geographies, sophisticated technical teams capable of autonomous governance implementation, and cultures valuing decentralized decision-making. Automated governance models suit organizations with technical sophistication to implement policy-as-code systems, substantial cloud resource counts making manual governance impractical, and clearly defined sovereignty policies amenable to encoding as executable rules.

Data sovereignty requirements may conflict with other system requirements, such that ensuring sovereignty controls may affect performance, cost, and functionality when compared to other cloud system environments. To reduce these trade-offs, organizations may adopt a risk-based approach, leverage technical enablers such as confidential computing, or architect system segmentation based on sovereignty requirements [11][12]. The tension between sovereignty compliance and operational optimization represents a persistent challenge requiring continuous management rather than definitive resolution.

Performance impacts arise from sovereignty controls in several ways. Geo-fencing restricts resource placement to approved regions, potentially requiring data to traverse longer network distances to reach processing resources, increasing latency. Encryption adds computational overhead for encryption and decryption operations. Customer-managed key architectures require network round-trips to external key management systems for cryptographic operations. Cost impacts similarly flow from sovereignty requirements, as multi-region deployments duplicate infrastructure across regions to satisfy localization requirements, and sovereign cloud regions often command premium pricing compared to standard regions.

Risk-based approaches to sovereignty compliance enable organizations to calibrate control intensity to risk levels, applying the most stringent controls to the highest-risk data while using lighter-touch governance for lower-risk scenarios. Technical enablers, including confidential computing, federated

learning, and privacy-enhancing technologies, offer capabilities to satisfy sovereignty objectives while minimizing performance, cost, and functional trade-offs. System segmentation based on sovereignty requirements creates architectures where different data categories and workloads are deployed to different regions, platforms, or infrastructure tiers based on their sovereignty characteristics.

Organizations can employ a left-shift approach and automated policy enforcement capabilities to turn sovereignty governance from a defensive imperative into a market differentiator when customers or regulators seek assurances about data sovereignty of cloud services. Left-shift approaches move governance activities earlier in the development lifecycle, catching potential compliance issues during design and development rather than at deployment or production stages. Organizations successfully integrating sovereignty into development workflows often find that governance, rather than impeding innovation, actually accelerates it by providing clear guidelines, reducing ambiguity, automating compliance verification, reducing uncertainty about production readiness, and preventing late-stage compliance surprises that would otherwise delay releases.

Conclusion

In summary, this article has shown that multi-cloud data sovereignty is a complex and multi-dimensional topic that requires an integrated legal, technical, and organizational governance approach that reflects the specificities of multi-cloud deployments compared to single clouds. There is no one-size-fits-all governance model that suits all situations; all organizations need to adopt a strategy that fits their regulatory environment and technical readiness. Technical mitigations enabling sovereign governance include geo-fencing, encryption, confidential computing, and policy-as-code. Other technologies, such as AI compliance automation and blockchain auditability, are developing and promise good governance. Organizations pursuing multi-cloud sovereignty governance can establish a foundation through advanced data classification, risk-based focus, mass automation, and multilayered controls through great visibility and rigorous security. Building sovereignty governance capabilities now in the multicloud journey positions organizations to best navigate the increasingly complex world of regulations and build trusted digital relationships in the future regulated world economy. Beyond being a compliance prerequisite, data sovereignty can be viewed as a demonstration of commitment to responsible data management and as a foundation for sustainable digital business practices.

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