

# The Establishment of The Yemen Arab Republic and The Role of The Popular Forces Union in Correcting Mistakes during the Era of President Abdullah Al-Sallal 1962-1967 AD

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## ABSTRACT

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The period during which Imam Muhammad al-Badr assumed power in Yemen was insufficient to influence a qualitative shift towards achieving the aspirations of the Yemeni people. The officers surprised him with their revolt, urging him on before he could take any reform steps.

On September 26, 1962, military officers in North Yemen revolted, declaring the Republic of Yemen. Imam al-Badr, who had only been in power for a few days, was able to flee to the north. Egypt, which had promised support to the military cell, rushed to send a military force including aircraft, tanks, and all types of weapons. This came after the deterioration of friendly relations between Imam Ahmad and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The revolutionaries attempted to use revolutionary language to inspire enthusiasm in Statement No. 3, which began with the phrase: "In the name of God and in the name of the people." It then indicated that the army leadership had not launched the revolution, but rather responded to the will of the people to carry out their blessed revolution. Statement No. 3 distinguished itself from previous ones by its political language, which explained to the people the conditions the country was experiencing. The statement also included political expressions.

The revolution entered a dangerous juncture as a result of the sharp polarization between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which had been a supporter and main backer of the royalist forces. The reason for the intransigence of the Saudi position was the fear that the revolution would spread within the kingdom.

The Al Wazir family, along with all the forces hostile to the political regime in Sana'a, supported the revolution, with some Yemeni tribes at the forefront of these supporters. This support provided significant momentum for the revolution. As a result, the Army's General Command Council issued three important decisions, including the establishment of the Revolutionary Command Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidential Council.

**Keywords:** Yemen, Revolutionary Command Council, Al Wazir, Mutawakkilite Kingdom, Republicans.

## Introduction

It appears that the period during which Imam Muhammad al-Badr assumed power in Yemen was not sufficient to effect a qualitative shift that would achieve the aspirations of the Yemeni people. The officers surprised him with their revolt and rushed him before he could take any reform steps.

On September 26, 1962, military officers in North Yemen revolted and declared the Republic of Yemen. Imam al-Badr, who had only been in power for a few days, managed to flee to the north. Egypt, which had promised support to the military cell, rushed to send a military force including aircraft, tanks and all kinds of weapons, after the friendly relations between Imam Ahmad and President Gamal Abdel Nasser had deteriorated.

## The death of Imam Ahmad and the rise of Imam al-Badr

The political circumstances that North and South Yemen experienced contributed to the crystallization of the threads of the outbreak of a revolution in Yemen, and its features began to become clear in Sana'a, which witnessed on September 18, 1962, the death of Imam Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid al-Din, who was suffering from a critical health condition, due to his deep injury, as a result of being exposed to a failed assassination attempt. The day after his death, his son and crown prince, Prince Muhammad al-Badr, officially took over the reins of power in the country.<sup>1)</sup> The scholars and army officers, including those who opposed and conspired against him, pledged allegiance to him. It seems that the ruling family overcame their differences and agreed to pledge allegiance to Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr as a successor to his father. It was even said that the family differences that existed within the family before the death of Imam Ahmad were nothing but bubbles and a trick that was hatched for the people, and that Imam al-Badr was no different from his predecessors among the imams who ruled Yemen, despite the great hope and optimism among the general public in the personality of the Crown Prince, of the possibility of achieving tangible steps for reform and developing the country from backwardness and reactionism, after he reached the seat of power and was pledged allegiance to rule, following the announcement of the death of his father, Imam Ahmad bin Yahya Hamid al-Din. However, from the achievements he made during his very short period of rule, we give the impression that he was not accused of it, as he announced that he would maintain the rule of law, help the oppressed, lay the foundation of justice, and issue laws that would ensure that citizens are equal in rights and duties. The next day, 21 September He signed six decrees. The first and second decrees stipulated that ministers, deputies, and senior army commanders would retain their positions. The third decree declared a general amnesty for all previous political incidents that had led to their perpetrators being imprisoned or fleeing the country. The fourth decree abolished the hostage system, and the fifth decree abolished all remaining obligations that had not been deposited in the state treasury until 1960, with the exception of loans. The sixth decree stipulated the salaries of army officers and soldiers <sup>(2)</sup>.

It appears that the period during which Imam Muhammad al-Badr assumed power in Yemen was not sufficient to effect a qualitative shift that would achieve the aspirations of the Yemeni people. The officers surprised him with their revolt and rushed him before he could take any reform steps.

Imam Al-Badr, Professor Ahmed Mohammed Noman, and some of those who remained supported the Yemeni Union, while Al-Zubayri remained silent. As for the Popular Forces Union, it did not honor or bless it, given their commitment to working for the republican system, as we see.

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The first political statement of the revolution leadership is clear:

**Firstly:** Communicating directly with the people through the radio to inform them of the revolution, the factors that led the army to carry out the revolution, and clarify its objectives.

**secondly:** Finding a new mechanism for communication between the army and the people, as the army leadership was keen to be close to the people and avoid making the mistakes that revolutionaries had previously made and that had been the reason for the failure of previous revolutionary attempts.

**Third:** The revolutionary leadership attempted to address the people in a language they understood, using radio as the only available means of communication the country possessed. It was easy to use to achieve the desired revolutionary goal of communicating with the masses, as its coverage covered most of Yemen's regions without any significant obstacles.

The revolutionary action of the army, as the actual leader and driving force of the revolution, was keen through the succession of various radio statements, with the aim of the army and the leadership of the revolution being close to the people, to inform them of all the developments facing the revolution and the revolutionaries since the outbreak of its first spark. The second statement of the leadership of the revolution appeared, in a brief manner.

The leadership tried to clarify the revolutionary work carried out by the Yemeni army and its leadership, in overthrowing the royal regime in Yemen. The statement also confirmed the emergence of the new name for the country, and referred to the name of the Yemen Arab Republic for the first time. The statement specified the time in which the name was changed, at exactly five o'clock on the night of Thursday, the 27th of Rabi' al-Thani 1382 AH, corresponding to September 26, 1962 AD. The statement was signed by the supreme command of the army, which began to control all the joints of government in the country after removing the Imamate regime.<sup>3)</sup>, who ruled Yemen for a longer period than any other historical period that the country had experienced (<sup>4</sup>).

It is clear from the above that the army and its leadership tried to confirm the following through the radio:

**Firstly:** Confirmation to the people by the army leadership of the final fall of the monarchy and the impossibility of its return to the rule of the people again.

**second:** Informing the people of the change of the country's new name from the Mutawakkilite Kingdom to its new name, the Yemen Arab Republic.

The revolutionaries tried to use revolutionary words that would inspire enthusiasm in Statement No. 3, which began with the phrase: "In the name of God and in the name of the people," then indicated that the army leadership did not carry out the revolution, but rather responded to the will of the people to carry out their blessed revolution. Statement No. 3 was distinguished from its predecessors in that it carried political language that explained to the people the conditions the country was going through. The statement was also not devoid of political phrases such as: "freedom" and others, as the army leadership tried to inform the people that it had seized power in the country, and the army considered itself responsible for it. It also explained the period in which it wished to remain to manage the country, in addition to informing the people of the political developments that the army had undertaken after seizing power, which is the army's intention to form a responsible popular government at the appropriate time.<sup>5)</sup>

It is clear from the above that the army tried through Revolutionary Statement No. 3 to achieve the following:

**First:** The political discourse of the revolution evolved, as the leadership of the revolution began to use political terms that reflected the revolutionary change in the country and its impact on the country's political will.

**second:** Informing the people about the army's political position on the general situation of the country by announcing its control of power, justifying this by the urgent need for this until a government that expresses the will of the people is formed. It is clear from the statements of the leadership of the revolution that the high command of the army wanted to keep the people constantly informed of the developments of events, given the leadership's need for a popular presence supporting the army and its leadership to be a counterpart to the revolution, and its desire to rid the country of the tyranny, injustice and backwardness caused by the regime in the country by isolating it from its regional and international surroundings in a way that obstructed any possibility of developing the country and advancing it in the various fields that the people need.

The military formed the Revolutionary Command Council and a Yemeni government headed by Field Marshal Abdullah al-Sallal. Professor Mohsen al-Aini was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. al-Baydani was Minister of Economy. Al-Baydani, with the support of the Egyptian forces, soon carried out a coup and appointed himself. He became Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Economy and Mineral Resources on October 1, 1962. He became the most powerful and, according to most Yemeni sources, began to make mistakes, which fueled the war against the republicans. At the same time, he disagreed with the rest of the republicans, including President Sallal himself. What he was unable to do was control the members of the President's Office, which consisted of members of the Popular Forces Union, Taha Mustafa, Ali Abdel Aziz Nasr, and Mohammed Al-Rubai. They did their best to prevent Al-Baidhani from gaining influence over the president and to try to diminish his influence. After months of encouraging President Al-Sallal, they were able to expel Al-Baidhani under the pretext of sending him to Cairo to request more military support. He accompanied him with Colonel Al-Jarmouzi, along with a secret letter to President Jamal, written in his own handwriting by the President's Office Director, Taha Mustafa, asking him not to return Al-Baidhani to Yemen.

Al-Baydani left Sana'a in October 1, 1962: President Gamal responded to President Al-Sallal's request and kept Al-Baidhani in Cairo. This was a success for the President's office in favor of the Republic and the Popular Forces Union, as Al-Baidhani closed his office in Cairo, which allowed and prevented anyone from entering Yemen. Among those who were able to return to Yemen were the head of the Popular Forces Union, Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, his brother Qasim, and their mother Fatima, after Al-Baidhani prevented them and others from entering Yemen during his stay in Sana'a.

This was the first disagreement between the Egyptians and the republicans, and it was supposed that harmony would prevail among the republicans themselves, but the division appeared between President Al-Sallal and the army officers with him, and between the class of judges and the senior tribal sheikhs with them, and the dispute between them would continue until President Al-Sallal was overthrown, and the dispute would arise again between those who were called progressives and those who were called conservatives, as we will see.<sup>6)</sup>

After the success of the revolution of September 26, 1962, Yemen witnessed radical political transformations. Signs of political elements and figures appeared who took religious thought as a basic starting point for their concepts, which were somewhat shrouded in ambiguity. Al-Zubairi and Al-Iryani, despite their strong adherence to the republic, wanted its content to be religious, while the Baathists, nationalists, and leftists sought to avoid it. The position of the Popular Forces Union regarding the establishment of the republican system was clear. It wanted it to be a true Islamic republic, with the door wide open to *ijtihad* to deal with new developments. Therefore, its interest was focused on resisting deviations in the republic so that these actions would not harm the true republic as they harmed the Islamic Imamate system. The difference in these orientations was one of the reasons for the disagreement between the republicans. In order for the republic not to fall victim to deviations, one of the thinkers of the Al-Wazir family (Professor Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir) stated in his message to the nation that what is desired in Yemen after the revolution is the establishment of a just and righteous government based on the will of the people, and that Shura is established from the first day, and that what is hoped for is to reach a government that does not displace the people of the country, but rather a government that helps its people, not a government that enables a soldier or soldiers to storm the homes of their fellow citizens. He also called for the establishment of a government that is not hostile to the Islamic religion.<sup>7)</sup> The revolutionary movement in the Arab world in general, and Yemen in particular, succeeded in stirring up people's feelings by fulfilling their dreams of change and transformation from the regimes they revolted against, but they failed to transform these dreams into valuable social applications, and to build a free, dynamic political structure characterised by awareness and comprehensiveness, and with ideas for building the economy on solid, strong and sound foundations under a general intellectual umbrella that produces the nation's civilisation <sup>(8)</sup>.

It is clear from the above that these ideas expressed by the thinker Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir express the following:

1. The deviation of the political goals that were hoped to be achieved after the success of the revolution of September 26, 1962.
2. The revolutionaries' reluctance to adopt the idea of Shura and the desired Islamic state that Yemeni society needs.
3. Calling for the necessity of establishing a just Islamic government that achieves social justice among members of society and addresses their problems and concerns.
4. The desire to build a state that works to address economic conditions and distribute them fairly among its citizens, without discrimination or political division, in order to achieve the principles of justice, equality, and coexistence.

The Al-Wazir family welcomed the revolution of September 26, 1962, after it took place. The thinker Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir and his brother, the poet Al-Qasim bin Ali Al-Wazir, announced their blessing for its occurrence. They worked through the political organization they founded in 1961, (the Union of Popular Forces), to support the new republic. They also tried to correct some of the deviations that accompanied the revolution. This position forced them to live in exile, opposing injustice and tyranny and calling for justice and fairness.<sup>9)</sup> Ibrahim Al-Wazir directly criticized how the actions led to, saying: Independence devoid of any national content is sufficient to

produce foreign political leaders, and this condition is an important pillar in the disruption of the structures of society, and that the cultural approach and method of applying the intellectual trend of the revolution poured - intentionally or unintentionally - into the interest of the colonial powers, and the reason for that, in his opinion, is due to the lack of awareness among politicians who did not realize that Yemeni society has its own specificity, and therefore the revolutionary coups made in the intelligence circles were only for the purpose of preventing the nation from moving in the right direction <sup>(10)</sup>Everything that happened was something else. In the beginning, thanks to the people's readiness and their support for the revolutionary movement, there was a revolution. But when the pivotal popular role was extinguished, the star of the revolution faded. This is what happened to the Yemeni revolution, whose star was extinguished quickly and astonishingly, and it became nothing but a form after the revolutionary work and action were emptied of their content.<sup>(11)</sup>

Despite the Al Wazir family's support for revolutionary action to change the country's ruling political regime, the deviation from the true path of the revolution, which was launched to alleviate the suffering of the people and the injustice they suffered as a result of the tyranny of the Imamate regime and its oppression of the people, and the deviation of revolutionary action from Islamic consultation, appears to have been the reason for the Popular Forces Union's opposition to the actions taking place under the name of the republican regime.

An example of this is what the thinker Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir pointed out in his criticism of the deviation of the revolutionary path, saying: Colonialism did not leave until it abandoned its ideas, and made them effective and influential enough to eliminate every voice and pursue any movement on various levels.<sup>(12)</sup>

It can be said that the Al Wazir family's position on the September 26, 1962 revolution was characterised by the following:

1. Their blessing and support for the revolution against the unjust monarchy, as the interests of all the people converged in getting rid of this regime.
2. Direct coordination with Yemeni opposition forces in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon to coordinate efforts and joint revolutionary action.
3. The September 26 Revolution marked a radical turning point for the Al Wazir family, who returned to Yemen from exile since the failure of the 1948 revolution.
4. The Al-Wazir family became involved in work with the Republic, and a number of members of this family were appointed to important government positions, and some of them were appointed to the embassies of the Yemen Arab Republic abroad.
5. The Al-Wazir family made their position clear regarding the political deviations that followed the September 26, 1962 revolution, and they had a declared position rejecting such actions.
6. Al-Wazir criticized the policies of the revolution's leaders and their failure to fulfill the people's aspirations from the revolution for freedom, consultation, and democracy, which the Yemeni people yearn for after their long suffering from injustice and oppression throughout the period of royal rule.

As previously mentioned, the Popular Forces Union was the first party to adopt a republican system in its bylaws. It found that the military revolution had prevented it from carrying out a popular republican revolution. Nevertheless, it viewed the declaration of the republic as a significant gain, and welcomed it while remaining wary of the militarization of the republic. Nevertheless, it fought alongside the republic against the monarchy and did its utmost to correct the mistakes that had led to the strengthening of the royalists, who were supported by the Saudi kingdom. These mistakes were committed administratively and militarily by al-Baidhani when he was the most powerful man in the republic thanks to the support of the Egyptians. These mistakes led to the incitement of severe disagreements within the republican ranks, as most of the republicans, both civilians and military, stood against him. However, the position of the Egyptian leadership in Yemen and its support for him did not affect his powers. Without that leadership, he would have been overthrown. al-Baidhani refrained from playing any role in the north, but the approach he outlined remained in the hands of the Egyptian military leadership. This kept the disagreements escalating. Thus, it became clear that al-Baidhani's expulsion from Yemen did not prevent the Egyptian leadership from controlling the civil administration alongside the military administration, which sparked a civil opposition in which all parties and organizations participated.



## Back to Yemen

After the Republican Revolution, Mrs. Fatima Abu Ras and her two sons, Ibrahim and his brother Ibrahim, returned to Yemen after the overthrow of Al-Baidani, who had taken from his office in Cairo the right to decide who among the Yemenis would travel and who would not. Among those banned from traveling were Mr. Ibrahim and Qasim. The conflict was at its peak between the republican forces and the royalist forces. After he settled there and realized that the republic - which he was the first party to call for and worked for as his party's system stipulated - had been emptied of its meaning and that the real conflict was no longer between a backward monarchy and a new republic, but rather between the Egyptians and the Saudis at the expense of the blood of the Yemenis, he wanted to establish the republic and address its deviation from another aspect. Ibrahim led a campaign that succeeded in retrieving a fly rope, and Qasim, with the campaign led by Captains Amin Abu Ras and Mut'i Damaj, supported the Bart front by the royalists. He remained there until the victory was consolidated. He returned to Sana'a and Ibrahim went to Bart and took over its affairs.<sup>13)</sup> But the conflict within the Republican wings and with the Egyptian leadership continued, and had it not been for the Egyptian forces that forcibly preserved the republic, the situation would have been much worse.<sup>14)</sup>

## The role of the Al-Wazir family in the political movement after the revolution:

The revolution entered a dangerous turning point as a result of the sharp polarization between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was a supporter of the royal forces and its main backer. The reason for the intransigence of the Saudi position was the fear of the revolution spreading inside it, in addition to the rapid support provided by both Egypt and the Soviet Union to the revolution, and this matter increased its political fears.<sup>15)</sup> The nascent republic was a heterogeneous mixture of politicians whose political orientations conflicted with some policies. The most prominent of these forces was what was known as the Third Force, which included a group of Yemeni liberals who resided in Egypt and allied with it, but whose political ideology differed completely from it.<sup>16)</sup> Those who allied with her are called dissident republicans.

Some leaders of the revolution took advantage of the great revolutionary momentum, and they persecuted the members of the Imamate regime and erected gallows for them, and carried out many executions without any trial and without any discrimination, and the confiscation of money and looting of homes because of the family name, and many people were subjected to injustice without being part of the Imamate regime, and the reason for that was that they were accused by the leadership of the revolution of being enemies of the revolution, even the Al-Wazir family who supported the revolution, their position was questioned, and they were considered disloyal to the revolution, and that their position was linked to their family interests and their influence in power, and that their opposition to the Imamate regime was nothing but riding the wave of opposition to reach personal interest, and the accusation of monarchy remained a sword hanging over the necks of many politicians, including the Al-Wazir family, so they were marginalized and excluded from important positions in the state after the revolution, and their competence and status did not intercede for them, in addition to the leaders of the revolution adopting the execution of many people without any crime they committed<sup>17)</sup>.

The year 1963 AD witnessed an Egyptian republican insistence on the victory of the republic over the royalist forces supported from abroad, despite all the disagreements between all the parties. The most distinctive feature of this war was the insistence on the victory of the revolution.<sup>18)</sup>

The Popular Forces Union called for the necessity of correcting the course of the revolution. This trend was in line with the desire of the Minister of Education, Muhammad Mahmoud al-Zubairi, who called for the republican system to be democratic and consultative, in accordance with the principles of the revolution, and for the essence of Islam to be dominant, while working to resist Egyptian interference in all matters in Yemen in an absolute manner, and opposing President Abdullah al-Sallal, who fell under the influence of the Egyptians. This trend was agreed upon by Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, and all the scholars and intellectuals who called for working to correct the course of the revolution politically. The matter ended with the call to hold the Amran Conference on the second of September 1963 AD, in which all opponents of the al-Sallal government and the Egyptian presence in Yemen agreed on the necessity of correcting relations with Egypt<sup>19)</sup>.

Correcting these matters was a common political point between Al-Zubayri and Al-Iryani, and the Popular Forces Union led by Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, who worked under the banner of pioneering Islamic thought, with some differences in visions and perceptions <sup>(20)</sup>The main goal was to correct the course of the September 26 Revolution and reduce the authority of the Egyptians over the internal administration.<sup>21)</sup>However, it appears that there is a disagreement between them—Zubairi and Al-Iryani on the one hand, and the Popular Forces Union on the other—over the origins and content of the republic. The Popular Forces Union believes that the true republic emerges from a popular base, not through military decision, because the experience of Arab republics only meant a change in form. Nevertheless, the Union welcomed its establishment on the basis of its reform.

### **The role of the Popular Forces Union in correcting mistakes during the era of President Abdullah al-Sallal 1962-1967 AD.**

Social division in Yemen during the Imamate era played a prominent role in dividing society, which was surrounded by factionalism, as the Sayyids and judges <sup>(22)</sup>They formed the main ruling leadership in the country, and the first leadership was the exclusive right of the masters of the family of the Prophet. The judges held prestigious administrative positions in the state's administrative apparatus, and represented the upper elite of the state. Alongside them was the class of scholars who were given a privileged position by the royal political system. However, after the Constitutional Revolution, political work was transferred to the military after 1962. <sup>(23)</sup>

Political efforts were largely unified towards the revolution of September 26, 1962, and the supportive and backing stance towards the revolution played a prominent role in helping the Yemeni army to tighten its grip on political power in the country, as the Free Officers Organization chose the leader Abdullah al-Sallal <sup>(24)</sup>The authority, and beside him a number of army officers of high ranks, and this political orientation of the army played a role in creating a state of discontent that resulted in a state of acute polarization that contributed to the country entering an unstable political situation, facilitating the process of foreign interference linked to regional and international balances, and giving it a suitable opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of Yemen after the success of the revolution, and this would affect the efforts of the revolution <sup>(25)</sup>.

Al Wazir's position on the formation of the Revolutionary Command Council:

Support the Al-Wazir family and all the forces hostile to the political regime in Sana'a, and at the forefront of the supporters<sup>some</sup>The Yemeni tribes, and this support formed a great momentum for the course of the revolution, resulting in the General Command Council of the Army issuing three important decisions, including: the establishment of the Revolutionary Command Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidential Council. Brigadier General Abdullah al-Sallal was chosen as Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Most of the ministerial positions were filled by people who were opposed to the Imamate rule outside Yemen. The Revolutionary Command Council tried to win all classes of the people over to the side of the revolution and defend it. It also defined the tasks of the republic in eliminating the rule of the absolute individual, abolishing the monarchy, and establishing an Islamic democratic republic based on social justice that represents the people and achieves their aspirations.<sup>26)</sup>The slogans were greatly welcomed by the Al Wazir family, who supported the revolution from its first moment, given the difficult conditions that Yemen was experiencing under the rule of Imam Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid al-Din <sup>(27)</sup>.

The revolution of September 26, 1962, faced major obstacles in its path to achieving its main goal of raising the standard of living of Yemen in all fields, away from the authoritarian rule with which the Mutawakkilite regime dealt with the masses of the people. This was in addition to the dissatisfaction among some Yemeni political forces in the revolution with the acceptance of a direct Egyptian role in managing Yemeni affairs.

The Yemen Arab Republic was exposed to a setback.<sup>FD</sup>Dangerous, after the revolution and the fear of the revolutionaries<sup>military</sup>It was dominated by royal forces, which were from the (Hashemite) families. Doubts arose about the loyalty of any Hashemite to the republic, even though the establishment of the republic was indebted to the Hashemite officers, and Ibrahim al-Wazir was the first to adopt the republic in his party's law before the establishment of the republic and in the days of Imam Ahmad. Doubt was the master of the situation, no matter

how loyal the Hashemites were to the new republic and the revolution.<sup>(28)</sup> Which made the republic appear as if it were one team against another, and this difference harmed the republicans.<sup>(29)</sup>

#### The role of the Popular Forces Union in the Amran Conference

Not even a year had passed since the establishment of the Republic until the tension between the Egyptians and the republicans and between the republicans and the republicans had reached a stage where Al-Eryani said, "This is what frightened those who were jealous of its independence and self-sufficiency."<sup>(30)</sup> It calls for holding a conference that softens the Egyptians' stance on the controlling grip and limits the powers of the President of the Republic in favor of his opponents. Because of this, the Americans - as the Beirut newspaper Al-Hayat says - What was published by the American weekly Newsweek the following month, Jumada al-Ula/October; it said: "President al-Sallal's regime has lost all sense of authority" and that the United States is now searching for a new regime to replace it." Then it said: "Newsweek added, through its correspondent: 'American diplomats and the Central Intelligence Agency are working actively—due to their fear of a failure in foreign policy—to isolate al-Sallal, force the Imam to abandon his claim to a throne that no longer exists, and establish a moderate government that is acceptable to both parties [the Saudis and the Egyptians]. Mr. Parkers-Zhart, the American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, has discussed this matter with Prince Faisal, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. Other American officials have made contacts with Mr. Ahmed al-Shami, the Imam's foreign minister. The royal leaders are listening to the vote at least, but they want President Abdel Nasser to withdraw all his forces."<sup>(31)</sup> In this context, what the British politician Mr. Paul Bristol mentioned when he came from the royal strongholds in Yemen after a visit to them falls in a statement he made to Al-Hayat newspaper on 20 Rabi' al-Awwal 83/8 September 63, that Saudi Arabia is not interested in the type of government as much as it is interested in the stability of the situation in it.<sup>(32)</sup>

On the basis of these efforts, a meeting took place between Judge Ahmed Al-Sayaghi, one of the Yemeni royal leaders on the border in the Al-Raheda region, and Judge Al-Aryani, Sheikh Sinan Abu Lahoum, and Abdul Salam Sabra. It was decided to call for the Imran Conference, and this conference was held under the leadership of Professor Al-Zubayri on September 2, 1963, i.e. one year after the revolution. The members of the Popular Forces Union, Ibrahim, Qasim, Al-Rubai, and Abdul Aziz Nasr, as well as all the prominent figures from the republicans, participated in it. When the Popular Unionists realized that the conference was moving in the direction of appeasement, they withdrew to the Al-Janat area, along with Sheikh Mujahid Abu Shawarib and Lieutenant Colonel Al-Hadary. They studied the situation and decided that the statement would include an article that was merged into the final statement after a debate with Sheikh Al-Zindani. The decisions, especially Decision 27, angered the Egyptians, and the conference failed, or was foiled.

The battles between the republicans and the royalists continued fiercely. After a meeting on September 14, 1964, King Faisal and President Gamal held a meeting in Alexandria following the second summit conference. They called for a conference to include the "disputing parties." Accordingly, a conference was held in Arkwet with the attendance of two delegations from each of the republicans, headed by Al-Zubairi, and a delegation from the royalists, headed by Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Shami, on October 20, 1964. They called for another conference and a ceasefire. The date of the meeting was set for Haradh, but the meeting did not take place. The "Youth Organization," which was formed to defend the independent republic, was persecuted. The reaction was for the "Youth Organization" to hold the "Sharara" conference on November 23, 1964, which was attended by many republican, civil, military and sheikhly figures. The anger of the Egyptians increased, and the Popular Union had no choice but to secretly leave Sana'a, carrying with it the decisions of the Youth Organization abroad.<sup>(33)</sup>

#### **Conclusion**

After completing our research, we reached the following results:

1. The political circumstances experienced by North and South Yemen contributed to the crystallization of the threads of the outbreak of a revolution in Yemen, and its features began to become clear in Sana'a, which witnessed the death on September 18, 1962, of Imam Ahmad bin Yahya Hamid al-Din, who was suffering from a critical health condition.



2. The period during which Imam Muhammad al-Badr assumed power in Yemen was not sufficient to effect a qualitative shift that would achieve the aspirations of the Yemeni people, as the officers surprised him with their revolt and rushed him before he could take any reform steps.
3. On September 26, 1962, military officers in North Yemen revolted and declared the Republic of Yemen. Imam al-Badr, who had only been in power for a few days, was able to flee to the north. Egypt, which had promised support to the military cell, rushed to send a military force including aircraft, tanks and all kinds of weapons, after the friendly relations between Imam Ahmad and President Gamal Abdel Nasser had deteriorated..
4. The revolutionaries tried to use revolutionary and enthusiastic language in Statement No. 3, which began with the phrase: "In the name of God and in the name of the people." It then indicated that the army leadership had not carried out the revolution, but rather responded to the will of the people to carry out their blessed revolution. Statement No. 3 was distinguished from its predecessors by its use of political language that explained to the people the conditions the country was going through.
5. The Al-Wazir family welcomed the revolution of September 26, 1962, after it took place. The thinker Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir and his brother, the poet Al-Qasim bin Ali Al-Wazir, announced their blessing for its occurrence, and they worked through the political organization they founded in 1961, (the Union of Popular Forces), to support the new republic.

#### Footnotes:

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- (1) Samira Ismail Al-Hassoun; Taiba Khalaf Abdullah, *The Impact of the Yemeni Revolution in 1962 on the Course of Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, Basra Literature Magazine, Issue (61), Basra, 2012, p. 103.
  - (2) Wikipedia Imam Al-Badr, Saeed Hamid Al-Ghalisi, Previous source, p. 266.
  - (3) See Appendix No. (2).
  - (4) Hussein Abdullah Al-Omari, *Modern and Contemporary History of Yemen (1516-1918 AD)* 1st edition, Dar Al-Fikr, Damascus, 1997, p. 170.
  - (5) See Appendix No. (3).
  - (6) See: Abdul Rahman Al-Eryani, *M* Previously issued, Vol. 1, p. 33.
  - (7) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *A Message to the Nation*, issued by the channel of thinker Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, concerned with intellectual and political heritage, the month of Ramadan, 1384 AH, pp. 3-4; published on the channel's link on the hill. QRam: <https://t.me/ibrahimwazir>
  - (8) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *On the verge of the fifteenth century AH, a study of divine laws and the contemporary Muslim*. 4th edition, Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 1989, p. 23.
  - (9) <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news/332208.htm>.
  - (10) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *On the verge of the fifteenth century AH, a study of the Sunnah*, p. 24.
  - (11) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *So that we do not go in the dark*, p. 11.
  - (12) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *Sectarianism is the last card of the high on earth*, Modern Age Publications, Dr. M, 1st ed., 1987 AD, pp. 11-12.
  - (13) See: All of this is what Zaid Al-Wazir wrote in Jari. D The Shura Council, under the title of the Union of Popular Forces, published various issues.
  - (14) See: Abdulrahman Al-Rahman Al-Eryani, *The previous source*, Vol. 2, p. 187.
  - (15) Aline Hamdan, Abdullah Al-Sallal and his political role in Yemen (1917-1994 AD), *Al-Baath University Journal*, Volume 43, Issue 16, 2021 AD, p. 86.
  - (16) Fred Halliday, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, translated by Muhammad Al-Rumaihi, a study published in the book *The September 26 Revolution: Studies and Testimonies for History*, Dar Al-Awda, Beirut, 1st ed., 1982, p. 77.
  - (17) Arafat Abdul-Khabir Al-Rumaima, *September 26, 1962 AD*, D.M., n.d., pp. 53-54.
  - (18) Abdullah Al-Bardouni, *The previous source*, pp. 404-406.
  - (19) Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, *The previous source*, pp. 100-101.
  - (20) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *So that we do not go in the dark*, p. 13.
  - (21) Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, *The previous source*, p. 103.
  - (22) Hashemites: They are a respectable social class in Yemen. They are called Sayyids, or Ahl al-Bayt. The Hashemites belong to the family of the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and his family and grant them peace. In the north of Yemen, they follow the Zaidi school of thought, and in the south, the Shafi'i school of thought. The Zaidis are distinguished by their claim that the sons of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, peace be upon him, are entitled to the imamate and caliphate. Qaid Numan al-Sharjabi, *Traditional social strata in Yemeni society*, 1st edition, Dar Al-Hadatha for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Beirut, 1986 AD, pp. 136-137.
  - (23) Abdul Aziz Qaid Al-Masoudi, *Landmarks of Contemporary Yemeni History: The Social Forces of the Yemeni Opposition Movement (1905-1948 AD)* 1st edition, Al-Sanhani Library, Sana'a, 1992 AD, pp. 21-22.
  - (24) Abdullah Al-Sallal (1917-1994): He is Abdullah bin Yahya Al-Sallal, who hails from the village of Shasan, Sana'a Governorate, from a poor family. He received his primary education in his hometown, then joined the orphanage in Sana'a and continued there for seven years. He was on the first mission sent by Imam Yahya to learn military sciences in Iraq in 1936. He excelled there and graduated with

the rank of second lieutenant. His three years of study had an impact on his awareness of the extent of development witnessed in Iraq, and this played a role in his participation in the 1948 revolution. After its failure, he was taken to prison, and was released after the 1955 coup. He became close to Crown Prince Mohammed Al-Badr, who appointed him commander of his personal guard. When the revolution of September 26, 1962 erupted, he helped the Free Officers and was chosen as the leader of the revolution. Jamal Hazam Al-Nazari, Al-Sallal Abdullah Yahya 1917-1994 AD, Yemeni Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. Al-Afeef Cultural Foundation, Sana'a, 2003A3, p. 1607-1610.

- (25) Ali Mohammed Hussein Al-Amiri, *The Impact of External Factors on Yemeni Political Life*, International Studies Journal, Issue (49), Baghdad, n.d., p. 133.
- (26) Elena Golubo-Vskaya, *The previous source*, pp. 270-271.
- (27) Ibrahim bin Ali al-Wazir, *So that we do not go in the dark*, p. 11.
- (28) Muhammad Abd al-Malik al-Mutawakkil, *Identity and Yemen's Political Crises*, Al-Masar Magazine, Issue 4, Yemeni Heritage and Research Center, 2003, p. 38.
- (29) Abdullah Al-Bardouni, *Previous source*, p. 55.
- (30) Abdulrahman Al-Rahman Al-Eryani, *Previous source*, p. 85.
- (31) Quoted from what Zaid Al-Wazir wrote in Al-Shura newspaper, from Al-Hayat newspaper Issue No. 5363. 19 Jumada al-Ula 83/9 October 63
- (32) newspaper Life Issue No. 5337, 9/8/1963 AD.
- (33) See: About the Youth Conference What he said about him Zaid Al-Wazir in Al-Shura newspaper; Abdul Rahman Al-Rahman Al-Eryani, *Previous source*, Part 2, p. 86 and beyond.

## References

- [1] Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, *Sectarianism: The Last Card of the High on Earth*, Modern Age Publications, 1st ed., 1987.
- [2] Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, *A Message to the Nation*, published by the thinker Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir Channel, which deals with intellectual and political heritage, Ramadan, 1384 AH.
- [3] Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, *On the Verge of the Fifteenth Century AH: A Study of Divine Laws and the Contemporary Muslim*, 4th ed., Dar Al-Shorouk, Cairo, 1989.
- [4] Ibrahim bin Ali Al-Wazir, *On the Verge of the Fifteenth Century AH: A Study of the Sunnah*.
- [5] Hussein Abdullah Al-Omari, *Modern and Contemporary History of Yemen (1516-1918)*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Fikr, Damascus, 1997.
- [6] Samira Ismail Al-Hassoun; Taiba Khalaf Abdullah, *The Impact of the 1962 Yemeni Revolution on the Course of Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, Basra Literature Magazine, Issue (61), Basra, 2012.
- [7] Arafat Abdul-Khabir Al-Rumaima, September 26, 1962, dm, nd
- [8] Fred Halliday, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, translated by Muhammad Al-Rumaihi, a study published in the book *The September 26 Revolution: Studies and Testimonies for History*, Dar Al-Awda, Beirut, 1st ed., 1982.
- [9] Wikipedia: Imam Al-Badr, Saeed Hamid Al-Ghalisi.
- [10] Aline Hamdan, Abdullah Al-Sallal and His Political Role in Yemen (1917-1994), *Al-Baath University Journal*, Volume 43, Issue 16, 2021.