

# Common US-Qatari goals in military and security: interests after 1990

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## ABSTRACT

The strategy and objectives of the US Central Command are derived from the US National Security Strategy and its orientations, as well as from the US military strategy. In fact, the US Central Command, which has been organized and provided with sufficient and necessary assistance by the United States to enable it to protect US interests in the area of responsibility, represents a serious threat to the peoples of this region and to all forms of growing movements, particularly nationalist movements hostile to the United States.

The United States has not been satisfied with the above military measures to ensure its hegemony and monopoly over the Arabian Gulf region, but has also sought to establish a set of defensive arrangements and involve the countries of the region, specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, in these arrangements with the aim of legitimizing them.

The GCC states have entered into bilateral security agreements with influential states in the international system, led by the United States, in an attempt to create a kind of regional interconnectedness with these countries. Perhaps most important of all the above is building international legitimacy for the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf region, in form and substance, despite the dangerous repercussions of this presence on Arab national security, especially after it was transformed from a temporary presence to a permanent one. This was announced by William Cohen, the former US Secretary of Defense, in late October 2000, when he said, "The US forces will remain forever, and there is no justification for their withdrawal." His companion, William Dowd, also confirmed this during his tour of the Gulf, when he said, "We will be here permanently." As for Colin Powell, the former US Secretary of State, he said that the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf is a long-term goal and not merely a temporary deterrent against President Saddam Hussein.

**Keywords:** United States of America, Qatar, international coalition, leadership strategy, economic planning

## INTRODUCTION

Qatari foreign policy coincided with American interests in the region during the period studied from 1990 to 2001, and the economic interests of the two countries became intertwined until Qatar became an indispensable strategic partner for the United States of America in the region. The importance of Qatar to the United States of America can be demonstrated through what the American Ambassador to Qatar, Timmy Davis, wrote:<sup>1</sup>On the website of the US Embassy in Qatar, he noted that "Qatar has a significant impact on global politics, from working to protect the United States in Afghanistan and facilitating the safe evacuations and relocation of thousands of Afghan citizens, to its role as a mediator with Iran... Qatar has proven itself a reliable ally and a vital mediator in resolving conflicts close to home and around the world."Economic planning and preparing for the economy of the future is critical to Qatar National Vision 2030. We look beyond the World Cup to the opportunities available for American companies to contribute to Qatar's long-term economic development."

### US leadership strategy and objectives in Qatar:

The strategy and objectives of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is derived from the US national security strategy and its directions and the US military strategy. This command organizes these strategies and then coordinates its programs with the US administration as well as with its allies to enhance cooperation and achieve

the goals it is entrusted to achieve through the continued US military presence in this region, and the readiness to fight even in peacetime within special programs prepared for intervention.<sup>2)</sup>

To support this strategy and protect American interests and the interests of its allies and friends in this region, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) has prepared a strategy for this region based on three axes:<sup>3)</sup>

**First: War:** It includes the following:

- 1- Entering into any potential war to protect American interests (in the area of responsibility), especially those that include the freedom of oil flow, freedom of navigation, and ensuring security and stability.
- 2- Developing military bases and maintaining a number of its armed forces to respond to expected military operations, enabling them to meet all military operations.
- 3- Threatening the use of force to deter regional conflicts that harm American interests in this region through its direct and continued presence, joint exercises and training, and other fortification measures to enhance and build mutual confidence.
- 4- Maintaining leadership readiness to fight to win any war decisively at all levels of conflict.
- 5- Protecting the Central Command Force elements by providing them with an appropriate level of security and safety.

**Second: Intervention:** It includes the following:<sup>4)</sup>

- 1- Maintain, support, and participate in security alliances and efforts with allied forces in a manner that safeguards U.S. interests and the interests of its allies (in the area of responsibility).
- 2- Develop and support the military capability of the Central Command (in the area of responsibility).
- 3- Support and consolidate efforts in the area of responsibility to combat the so-called threats of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information warfare, and drug trafficking.
- 4- Establish friendly relations with the region's military and political leaders.
- 5- Developing integrated regional intervention approaches in cooperation with their allies through unified commands and non-governmental organizations.

**Third: Development:** It includes the following:

- 1- Develop and support environmental and humanitarian efforts to provide rapid response to crises and disasters.

#### **Environmental and humanitarian.**

Informing American leaders and the American public of the importance of the area of responsibility to American interests

Create a positive climate for central leadership leaders that encourages innovation and develops future leaders by providing them with a high standard of living and developing their capabilities.

Contribute to the development of the development system concept and the assessment of operational capabilities.

Ensuring security preparedness and vigilance at the economic, political and social levels.

#### **- The objectives of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) <sup>5)</sup>:**

The former commander of this command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, defined it as follows: Strengthening regional stability by asserting US influence through its military presence and assistance.

- 1- Preserving the free world's access to the oil resources of the Arabian Gulf region.
- 2- Limiting the ability of unfriendly governments to destabilize or undermine friendly and allied governments.
- 3- Deter any external aggression.
- **Achieving these goals:** Achieving the goals requires the following:<sup>6)</sup>
  - 1- Rapid response to hazard warning signals.
  - 2- Developing kinetic capabilities that allow for the rapid dispatch of forces to the Arabian Gulf region and sustaining these forces with multiple air and sea lines of communication.
  - 3- Obtaining approval for the establishment of land sites for the purpose of pre-positioning equipment and facilities and developing these sites.
  - 4- Obtaining airspace rights and facilities from a number of friendly and allied countries.
  - 5- Securing long air and sea lines of communication to sustain combat operations.
  - 6- Obtaining the right to use and develop selected airports and ports.

- 7- Obtaining additional support agreements with other host countries on the way to and from the Arabian Gulf region.
- 8- Improving the central command's loading and unloading capabilities to compensate for the lack of local infrastructure and locally trained technicians.
- 9- Ensuring water supplies, medical services, communications and transportation for individual and austerity combat operations.

In fact, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM, which has been organized and provided with sufficient and necessary assistance by the United States in a manner that makes it capable of protecting American interests in the area of responsibility, represents a serious threat to the peoples of this region and to all forms of growing movements, especially nationalist movements hostile to the United States.<sup>7</sup>

The United States was not satisfied with the aforementioned military measures to ensure its hegemony and monopoly over the Arabian Gulf region, but rather sought to establish a set of defensive arrangements and involve the countries of the region, specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, in these arrangements with the aim of giving them a legitimacy on the grounds that they are satisfactory to the ruling official circles. Therefore, the United States sought to leave no security option that could be penetrated into the Arabian Gulf region without promoting it. For this reason, Reno Taylor, Commander of the US Naval Forces in the Arabian Gulf, called for the necessity of building a defensive alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He expanded on this proposal by saying that we do not want to leave a vacuum this time <sup>(8)</sup>In order for the United States to play the role of external guarantor of these arrangements, it worked on three levels:<sup>9</sup>

- 1- Achieving the greatest possible degree of cooperation between local allies.
- 2- Concluding bilateral defense agreements and treaties between it and each ally separately.
- 3- Establishing a command, control, and military system in the Arabian Gulf region is directly subject to the American strategic decision, which places the United States' national interests first. This necessarily entails some direct military presence on land and sea, as well as the prepositioning of weapons and military equipment to facilitate rapid intervention when necessary.

The reasons that prompted the United States to propose such projects are:

- 1- Monopolizing the main role in the Gulf security arrangement.
- 2- Providing legal cover for a permanent US military presence in the Arabian Gulf.
- 3- Dismantling the Arab regional system.
- 4- Reducing the European role in the Arabian Gulf region.
- 5- Reducing dependence on regional parties.

### **Security agreements**

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have entered into bilateral security agreements with countries active in the international system, led by the United States, in an attempt to create a kind of regional connection with these countries.<sup>10</sup>It is worth noting that these agreements already existed before the Second Gulf War in 1991, but this war added new support to them. These agreements stipulated the commitment of the GCC countries to the following:<sup>11</sup>

- 1- The prepositioning of weapons and military equipment used to defend the GCC states that are signatories to these agreements.
- 2- Conducting joint maneuvers and training.
- 3- Providing other assistance agreed upon by the parties concerned.

The security agreements are a reflection of the American strategy and one of the most important American goals behind the Second Gulf War, according to what was stated by General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the international coalition against Iraq. Dick Cheney, the former US Secretary of Defense, was responsible for drafting these security agreements and arranging for the approval of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and he was able to accomplish this during his Gulf tour in 1991/5.<sup>12</sup>

In fact, most of the provisions of these agreements are confidential, and some of them are in violation of international and regional texts and charters, such as the United Nations and the Arab League, which are based on rejecting secret diplomacy and secret agreements that affect the sovereignty of other countries.<sup>13)</sup> This was made clear by Dick Cheney in 1991, when the final signing of the agreements took place, some of them would remain secret and be presented to Congress on the condition that nothing be announced.<sup>14</sup>

As for the elements that make up the security agreements, they were defined by William Perry, the former US Secretary of Defense, on December 18, 1994, before the Foreign Relations Committee, as follows:<sup>15</sup>

- 1- Strengthening the individual strength of each GCC country
- 2- Working to enhance the collective capacity of the GCC countries to defend themselves through the Gulf Cooperation Council.
- 3- Use the rules and facilities provided.

In addition to operating during times of crisis, that is, when the security of one party to the security agreement is threatened, which does not necessitate the conclusion of new agreements, this is based on developments on the scene. These actions, under such circumstances, appear to be procedural and routine, taken by military leaders, not political ones. This opens the door for the United States to use Gulf military bases and facilities at any time and under any circumstances.

The political objectives of the security arrangements were determined as follows:<sup>16</sup>

- 1- The need to strengthen and modernize allied regional parties.
- 2- Encouraging local forces to affirm their ties with the United States after the latter has strengthened its credibility.
- 3- Weakening regional threats, especially from Iraq and Iran, and the latter's support for the Islamic awakening and Islamic movements.

Perhaps the most important of all the above is building international legitimacy for the American military presence in the Arabian Gulf region.<sup>17)</sup> In form and content, despite the serious implications this presence has on Arab national security, especially after it turned from temporary to permanent. This is what William Cohen, the former US Secretary of Defense, announced in late October 2000, saying, "The US forces will remain forever and there is no justification for their withdrawal."<sup>18)</sup> And what was also confirmed by William Dutt, his companion during his Gulf tour, when he said, "We will be here permanently."<sup>19)</sup> As for Colin Powell, the former US Secretary of State, he said that the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf is a long-term goal and not just a temporary deterrent against President Saddam Hussein.<sup>20)</sup>

In this context, Ari Fleischer, the former White House spokesman, confirmed in a press conference that "Bush believes that the American military presence in the Middle East is absolutely necessary for the stability of this dangerous region."<sup>21)</sup> What helps in this is that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are currently more open to military cooperation with the United States, and that they will accept security arrangements with the United States, especially if they remain secret, which has prompted the United States to formulate and put forward many security concepts and perceptions that express, above all, its points of view, and then implant them through intimidation and enticement in the minds and orientations of the region's leaders, thus trying to contain the Gulf countries through contemporary alliances.<sup>22)</sup>

Thus, the State of Qatar signed the security agreement with the United States as follows:

Qatar's security agreements with the United States are no different in substance from those signed by the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Under these agreements, Qatar granted US forces unhindered access to Doha International Airport, its ports, and its military bases. Qatar also provided other facilities, including the storage of equipment and supplies such as fuel, bombs, and ammunition. US military personnel were also allowed access to all these facilities even without passports.<sup>23)</sup>

**FOOTNOTES**

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- (1) Timmy Davis, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, was appointed Ambassador to Qatar on August 4, 2022. He is a senior official in the U.S. Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor. From the U.S. Embassy website in Qatar: <https://qa.usembassy.gov/ar/>
- (2) Commanders Strategy.p  
<http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/cinc-strategy.htm>
- (3) Ibid. pp1-2
- (4) Ibid. pp1-2
- (1) Kabi Tabarani, *The Winter of Rage in the Gulf*, 2nd ed., Dar Al-Jalil Publishing House, Beirut, 1991, p. 58.
- (6) Strategic Bulletin: Southwest Asia and the Middle East in the American Strategic Perspective, Volume 5, Issue (12-13) Middle East Center for Research and Information, London, 1984, p. 16.
- (7) Mustafa Ibrahim Al-Shammari, previously mentioned source, p. 74.
- (8) Muhammad Jawad Ali, *National Security between Local Forms and Forms of Borrowed Security*, International Studies Journal, Issue 9, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2000, p. 14.
- (9) Abdullah Fahd Al-Nafisi, *Iran and the Gulf: The Dialectic of Integration and Exclusion 1978-1998*, International Politics Magazine, Issue 137, Cairo, July 1999, p. 58.
- (10) Muhammad Jawad Ali, previously mentioned source, p. 14
- (11) Tawfiq Najm Al-Anbari, *The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and Iran in the Gulf Regional System*, PhD Thesis (unpublished), College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 1991, p. 33.
- (12) Kabi Tabarani, previously mentioned source, p. 213.
- (13) Muhammad al-Sa'id Idris, previously mentioned source, p. 545
- (14) Wael Mohammed Ismail, *Security Agreements between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries and Their Negative Impacts*, Journal of International Studies, Issue 9, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2000, p. 100
- (15) Tawfiq Najm al-Anbari, previously mentioned source, p. 107.
- (16) Saad Naji Jawad and Dr. Munim Sahi Al-Ammar, previously mentioned source, p. 45.
- (17) Muhammad Jawad Ali, previously mentioned source, p. 13.
- (18) Wael Muhammad Ismail, previously mentioned source, p. 19.
- (19) The same source, p. 23.
- (20) Powell: Saudi Arabia did not demand the withdrawal of US forces. Al Jazeera Net 2002, p. 1.  
<http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2002/1/1-20-14.htm>
- (21) The United States confirms the continued presence of its forces in Saudi Arabia. Al Jazeera Net 2002, p. 1..  
<http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2002/1/1-18-14.htm>
- (22) Nazem Abdul Wahid Jasour, *Gulf-American Security Concepts and the Future of Regional Cooperation in the Region*, Strategic Studies Journal, Issue 5, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, 1998, p. 228.
- (23) Nafie Al-Hassan, *Interests and the Competition of International and Regional Powers in the Arabian Gulf*, Afaq Magazine, Issue 3, Future Academy for Creative Thinking, p. 3.  
<http://www.aafaq.org/fact3/2.htm>

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- [2] Commanders Strategy.



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<http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/cinc-strategy.htm>

- [3] Ibid. pp1-2
- [4] Ibid. pp1-2
- [5] Kabi Tabarani, previously cited source.
- [6] Kabi Tabarani, *The Winter of Fury in the Gulf*, 2nd ed., Dar Al-Jalil Publishing House, Beirut, 1991.
- [7] Muhammad al-Saeed Idris, previously cited source.
- [8] Muhammad Jawad Ali, previously cited source.
- [9] Muhammad Jawad Ali, previously cited source.
- [10] Mustafa Ibrahim Al-Shammari, previously cited source, Muhammad Jawad Ali, *National Security between Local Forms and Forms of Borrowed Security*, Journal of International Studies, Issue 9, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2000.
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- [18] The same source.
- [19] The United States confirms the continued presence of its forces in Saudi Arabia. Al Jazeera Net, 2002,  
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