Post-Quantum Cryptography: Securing Digital Systems in the Quantum Era
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Abstract
Quantum computing threatens the public-key mechanisms that underpin authentication, key establishment, software signing, public-key infrastructure, and confidentiality on modern networks. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) responds by replacing vulnerable number-theoretic assumptions with problems for which no efficient classical or quantum attacks are known. It analyzes the quantum threat model, the NIST standardization process as it stood before final FIPS publication, the principal lattice-, hash-, code-, multivariate-, and isogeny-based design families, implementation-security failures, protocol integration, and enterprise migration. Particular attention is given to CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, SPHINCS+, Classic McEliece, and the operational lessons from SIKE and multivariate cryptanalysis. The study argues that algorithm selection alone is insufficient: successful quantum readiness requires cryptographic inventory, cryptoagility, hybrid transition mechanisms where appropriate, protocol and certificate reengineering, side-channel-resistant implementations, interoperability testing, and governance over long-lived data. The resulting migration model separates discovery, prioritization, laboratory validation, controlled rollout, and decommissioning of vulnerable public-key cryptography. The evidence indicates that PQC migration is best treated as a multi-year systems-engineering program rather than a library upgrade, because public-key algorithms are embedded in protocols, devices, identities, trust stores, hardware roots, and operational processes with widely different replacement cycles.